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INTRODUCTION
When a tax-exempt entity is both able and willing to lend its
exemption to other taxpayers, tax-averse parties line up to take advantage of
its largess (and, in the process, reduce their own tax bill). Congress, eager to
prevent such abuse of the exemption, decided that, in some circumstances,
it would tax entities that would otherwise be exempt from taxation. In this
Article, I show that Congress’s response to such “lending” has failed to
solve the problem and, in fact, is harmful to tax-exempt entities. I propose a
new way—one that builds upon existing law—to combat the abuses
perpetrated through tax-exempt entities.
It was inevitable that taxpayers would exploit the exemption granted to
certain charitable entities. The Internal Revenue Code is a patchwork of
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provisions enacted at different times and for different purposes.1 Congress
uses the tax law both to raise revenue2 and for unrelated purposes such as
“encouraging particular types of investment, supplying economic relief to
targeted groups of taxpayers . . . and regulating the economy, not to
mention enhancing the political power of politicians among their
constituents.”3 Such a broad array of goals inexorably leads to a complex
and confusing regime,4 and the tax exemption provides one of the many
cracks exploited by savvy taxpayers.5
In the United States, the difference between what taxpayers owe in any
given year and what they pay on time—the tax gap—is about $345 billion.6
An estimated $40 billion to $70 billion of that tax gap results from U.S.
taxpayers using tax havens to whittle down their tax bills.7 Congress has
worked for years to narrow the tax gap.8
1
See, e.g., Hous. Textile Co. v. Comm’r, 173 F.2d 464, 464 (5th Cir. 1949) (“This petition brings
up for solution one of those difficult jigsaw tax law puzzles all too common in the present deplorable
crazy quilt patchwork state of the Internal Revenue laws.”).
2
Richard A. Westin & Sanford E. Gaines, The Relationship of Federal Income Taxes to Toxic
Wastes: A Selective Study, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 760 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of the Code is
to raise revenue . . . .”). But see Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments:
Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825, 865 (1996)
(“[I]f the sole purpose of the tax code were to raise revenue, the Code would be much shorter and much
simpler.”).
3
Andrew D. Cuccia & Gregory A. Carnes, Simplifying the Personal Income Tax, 55 TAX NOTES
1817, 1817 (1992).
4
See, e.g., Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947) (“[T]he words of
such an act as the Income Tax . . . merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless
procession . . . leav[ing] in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully
concealed purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the
most inordinate expenditure of time.”).
5
See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible
Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 383 (2002) (“[E]ven if an anti-abuse
rule were adopted, ongoing amendments to the Code or regulations may continue to be necessary to
close specific loopholes.”).
6
See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 5 (2006), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/otptaxgapstrategy%20final.pdf.
7
In 2002, an IRS consultant estimated that the United States lost $70 billion annually in taxes to
offshore tax evasion. See Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in Cayman
Accounts, 103 TAX NOTES 956, 958 (2004). More recently, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration estimated that the total international tax gap was between $40 billion and $123 billion
annually, with between $40 billion and $70 billion of that tax gap resulting from tax haven activity.
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., A
COMBINATION OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND INCREASED IRS CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY ARE
REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX GAP 4 (2009), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2009reports/2009IER001fr.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY, TAX
GAP].
8
Congress’s attempt to prevent tax haven abuse alone involves several separate regimes. In 1962, it
enacted the subpart F rules to reduce the benefits available by investing in tax haven corporations. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition and Multinational Competitiveness: The #ew Balance of
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In Congress’s attempts to narrow the tax gap by preventing taxpayers
from hiding their money in tax havens, it has inadvertently pushed taxexempt entities to do the opposite. As a result of the laws enacted to prevent
tax-exempt entities from lending their exemption to tax evaders (i.e., the
unrelated debt-financed income rules), tax-exempt entities cannot invest in
U.S. hedge funds. Instead, tax-exempt entities that want hedge fund returns
must invest through corporations organized in tax havens.9 And these
investments are far from negligible: as many as one-third of all hedge fund
assets may be attributable to tax-exempt investors, including endowments
and pension funds.10
Even if the unrelated debt-financed income rules did not force taxexempt entities to shift their investments from U.S. to tax haven hedge
funds, the rules are bad tax policy, failing to prevent even abusive
transactions of the type that they were passed to prevent, while at the same
time distorting tax-exempt entities’ legitimate economic decisions.
There is a simple solution to the problems that the unrelated debtfinanced income rules present: Congress should repeal them. Tax-exempt
entities would no longer face distortions of their investment decisions. At
the same time, in order to prevent tax-exempt entities from lending their
exemption, Congress or the Treasury Department should expand the tax
shelter rules to capture these abusive transactions.11
Subpart F—Review of the #FTC Foreign Income Project, 18 TAX NOTES INT’L 1575, 1575 (1999). For
a brief overview of the subpart F regime, see infra note 94. Later, Congress supplemented the subpart F
rules with another set of rules aimed at reducing the ability of U.S. taxpayers to exploit tax havens to
reduce their taxes, called the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) regime. See, e.g., David M.
Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1382 (2001). For a brief
overview of the PFIC rules, see infra note 94. More recently, Congress attempted to discourage U.S.
corporations from moving their profits to tax havens by enacting “anti-inversion” legislation. See Lee A.
Sheppard, Taking the Good with the Bad in the Anti-Inversion Rule, 126 TAX NOTES 913, 913 (2010).
And on July 12, 2011, Senator Carl Levin introduced, for the fifth time, legislation that would treat
certain foreign corporations as domestic corporations for tax purposes. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S.
1346, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011); see also Meg Shreve, Levin Tweaks, Reintroduces Bill Targeting
Offshore Tax Shelters, 132 TAX NOTES 230, 230 (2011) (stating that the Tax Haven Abuse Act resulted
from “10 years of committee hearings and investigative work”). Still, it is not currently clear whether
Congress will eventually pass the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. Even if the Act never becomes law,
however, Congress will almost certainly make another move toward collecting the revenue it loses to tax
havens eventually.
9
See infra Part I.C.
10
Martin A. Sullivan, Offshore Explorations: Caribbean Hedge Funds, Part 2, 118 TAX NOTES
255, 258 (2008). Because hedge funds are lightly regulated and most data about hedge funds come from
voluntary surveys, it is not possible to know the identities of hedge fund investors with any certainty.
Still, survey data paint a general portrait of the body of hedge fund investors. Id. at 255.
11
The centerpiece of the tax shelter rules is the requirement that participants disclose “reportable
transaction[s]” in which they participate. I.R.C. § 6111(a) (2006). Titled “Disclosure of reportable
transactions,” prior to 2004, the name of Section 6111 was “Registration of tax shelters.” See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 6111 (2000); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 815(a), 118 Stat.
1418, 1581 (2004) (amending I.R.C. § 6111 (2000)). By expanding the tax shelter rules, the IRS would
continue to have the ability to penalize parties engaging in abusive transactions.
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This Article begins in Part I by discussing situations in which Congress
has determined it is appropriate for tax-exempt entities to pay taxes. It will
look at the reasons underlying Congress’s departure from its normal
treatment of those organizations to which it has granted an exemption. It
will also discuss how hedge funds have used tax havens to accommodate
the special needs of their tax-exempt investors. Part II will then discuss how
U.S. taxpayers can use tax havens to avoid paying taxes and why taxexempt entities’ use of tax havens is qualitatively different and not abusive.
Part III will explore the purposes for which Congress enacted the
unrelated debt-financed income rules. It will evaluate their effectiveness at
preventing the abuses that Congress saw as well as the unintended
distortions they introduce into tax-exempt entities’ decisionmaking
processes. Finally, Part IV will propose that the unrelated debt-financed
income regime be repealed and that abusive behavior by tax-exempt entities
be policed instead by the reportable transaction rules.
I. TAXING SELECTED INCOME EARNED BY TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES
Qualifying tax-exempt entities generally find themselves outside of the
scope of the federal income tax.12 Charitable organizations have been
continuously exempt from taxation since the enactment of the first
corporate income tax13 in spite of commentators’ struggles to articulate a
comprehensive justification for exempting certain organizations from tax.14
Even charitable organizations must occasionally pay taxes, though. An
otherwise tax-exempt entity owes taxes on its “unrelated business taxable
income” (UBTI) as if it were an ordinary corporation.15 UBTI generally
consists of active income earned by a tax-exempt entity from carrying on a

12

I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006).
Leo L. Schmolka, Income Taxation of Charitable Remainder Trusts and Decedents’ Estates:
Sixty-Six Years of Astigmatism, 40 TAX L. REV. 1, 5 (1984) (“Since the inception of the modern income
tax in 1913, the Code has reflected Congress’ purpose of fostering a broad array of charitable activities
by exempting them from federal income tax.” (footnote omitted)). Even before then, charitable
corporations were exempt from tax under the Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. See
Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A
Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 426 n.16 (1998). However, the Supreme Court
declared the Revenue Act of 1894 unconstitutional in 1895. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 586 (1895), modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
14
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1381 (1991) (“Due primarily to the vast array of activities to which the
exemption has been applied, it has defied all past attempts to formulate a synthesizing concept of
charitable.”). Notwithstanding the difficulty in formulating a precise justification for the exemption of
certain organizations from the federal income tax, this Article will assume both that the exemption
serves a public purpose and that it will continue, albeit with some marginal periodical changes. See, e.g.,
Evelyn A. Lewis, Charitable Waste: Consideration of a “Waste #ot, Want #ot” Tax, 30 VA. TAX REV.
39, 48 n.30 (2010).
15
I.R.C. § 511(a).
13
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trade or business.16 It also includes income earned by a tax-exempt entity
from an investment bought using borrowed money.17 This subset of UBTI is
known as “unrelated debt-financed income.”18 The UBTI and unrelated
debt-financed income rules effectively limit the types of investments that
tax-exempt entities are willing to make as well as the manner in which taxexempt entities can make the investments.
A. UBTI Generally
Prior to the enactment of the UBTI rules in 1950, a for-profit business
could escape taxation if it was wholly owned by a tax-exempt entity and its
income was used exclusively to support the owner’s exempt purposes.19
That changed in 1950 when, in response to the perceived unfair advantages
these businesses could enjoy, Congress enacted the “unrelated business
income tax.”20
The Mueller Macaroni Company—the “prototypical and most familiar
unrelated business”21—illustrates Congress’s motive for enacting the
unrelated business income tax. In the 1940s, a group of benefactors donated
the stock of C.F. Mueller Company, then the country’s largest manufacturer
of macaroni, to New York University (NYU).22 Because Mueller was
wholly owned by NYU, a tax-exempt organization, its profits were not
taxable,23 in spite of the fact that making macaroni was unrelated to NYU’s
charitable purpose. Congress’s worries about “the effect these tax-free
enterprises had on their competitors resulted in the passage of” the UBTI
provisions.24 After 1950, NYU’s profits from making macaroni were
taxable as UBTI.
But unrelated business encompasses more than just tax-exempt entities
running factories. Income earned by a tax-exempt entity is UBTI if it meets
three criteria: (1) it must be income from a trade or business, (2) the trade or
business must be “regularly carried on” by the tax-exempt organization, and
(3) the trade or business must not be “substantially related” to the
organization’s performance of its tax-exempt purpose.25
16

Id. §§ 512(a), 513(a).
Id. § 514(a).
18
Id.
19
Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L.
REV. 605, 608 (1989).
20
Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of #onprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good
Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807, 817–18 (1989) (“A conspicuous example was the passage of the
unrelated business income tax in 1950, a provision that effectively withdraws corporate income tax
exemption from the commercial activities of all nonprofits, including charities.”).
21
Hansmann, supra note 19, at 608.
22
Diane L. Fahey, Taxing #onprofits out of Business, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 549 (2005).
23
C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1951).
24
C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 479 F.2d 678, 681 (3d Cir. 1973).
25
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (as amended in 1983).
17
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For example, a portion of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (NCAA) revenue on its annual Men’s Division I Basketball
Tournament comes from selling advertising in the Tournament programs.26
The IRS claimed that this advertising revenue was UBTI and that the
NCAA owed taxes on that portion of its revenue. The NCAA conceded that
the sale of advertising space was a trade or business and that it was not
substantially related to the NCAA’s exempt purpose, but argued that its
selling advertising in tournament programs was not regular enough to meet
the second criterion of the test.27 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
NCAA.28 The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that the Treasury
Regulations, in defining “regularly carried on,” state that the test should be
applied in light of the UBTI’s purpose of preventing unfair competition
with for-profit businesses.29 The court decided that although the NCAA’s
programs solicited the same advertisers as, for example, Sports Illustrated,
the NCAA’s once-a-year publication was too infrequent to actually compete
for advertisers with such magazines.30 Treating such income as UBTI
“therefore would not further the statutory purpose.”31
The results would have been different, however, if the NCAA had been
publishing its programs monthly. The American College of Physicians, a
tax-exempt organization, published Annals of Internal Medicine, a monthly
medical journal.32 The American College of Physicians screened the
advertisements for accuracy and relevance33 but sold the advertising space
at rates competitive with the rates charged by other medical journals.34 The
government argued that revenue from advertising in a journal published by
a tax-exempt entity was per se UBTI, based in part on legislative statements
indicating that failing to treat such revenue as UBTI would create unfair
competition.35 While the Supreme Court refused to find a per se rule, it did
hold that the revenue constituted UBTI.36 The Supreme Court did not
address whether Annals of Internal Medicine had an unfair competitive
advantage in competing with other medical journals for advertisers, but the
regularity of its publication suggests that treating it as UBTI would further
the legislative purpose in enacting UBTI.

26

NCAA v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1421–22.
28
Id. at 1424.
29
Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1983).
30
#CAA, 914 F.2d at 1425.
31
Id.
32
United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 836 (1986).
33
Id.
34
Am. Coll. of Physicians v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 531, 533 (Ct. Cl. 1983), rev’d, 743 F.2d 1570
(Fed. Cir. 1984), rev’d, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
35
475 U.S. at 842–43.
36
Id. at 850.
27
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Traditionally, commentators justify taxing tax-exempt entities on their
UBTI because such unrelated business activities create unfair competition
with for-profit entities.37 This unfair advantage has two parts: First, because
tax-exempt entities do not pay taxes, they can charge lower prices than their
for-profit competitors and still earn the same return.38 Second, because they
can accumulate earnings more quickly than their for-profit competitors, taxexempt entities can grow faster and have a lower risk of bankruptcy.39
In addition, commentators argue that it is necessary to tax tax-exempt
entities on their active income in order to protect the corporate tax base. If
the unfair competition were to give tax-exempt entities a significant
advantage over for-profit entities, tax-exempt entities would—the argument
goes—eventually be able to purchase a large portion of their competitors or
drive them into bankruptcy.40 As a result, as taxable businesses disappeared
and tax-exempt entities became responsible for a larger portion of business
activities, the government would collect less revenue.
B. Unrelated Debt-Financed Income
Included under the UBTI umbrella is unrelated debt-financed income.41
The unrelated debt-financed income rules say that if a tax-exempt entity
borrows money and uses that money to purchase an income-producing
asset, a percentage of that income will be taxable as UBTI.42 Under the
unrelated debt-financed income rules, income from a passive activity—one
clearly not derived from a trade or business such as dividends earned from
securities in an investment portfolio—can be transformed into UBTI if the
tax-exempt entity borrows money in order to make the purchase.
Debt-financed passive income does not organically fit in the world of
UBTI. When Congress enacted the original UBTI rules, it deliberately
exempted passive income, viewing passive income both as a traditional
activity of tax-exempt entities and as unlikely to result in unfair
competition.43 Why, then, would borrowing money transform passive
37

Hansmann, supra note 19, at 605 (“One key dispute over the nonprofits’ exemption privilege
centers on their unrelated business activities—that is, profit-making activities that a tax-exempt
nonprofit corporation undertakes primarily as a source of income and that are not otherwise related to
the principal purposes for which the nonprofit was formed and granted tax exemption.”).
38
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1017, 1023 (1982).
39
See id.
40
See Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1491 (2005).
41
I.R.C. § 514(a) (2006).
42
Id.
43
See Stone, supra note 40, at 1501–02. Arguing against this initial exemption, Professor Stone
contends that allowing tax-exempt entities to earn passive income tax-free does, in fact, create unfair
competition with taxable investors. Id. at 1497. He argues that unfair competition concerns did not
actually underlie the enactment of UBTI; rather, Congress was using the UBTI to encourage tax-exempt
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investment income into active trade or business income? Clearly, it would
not.
But the unrelated debt-financed income rules were meant to prevent a
different set of abusive behavior than were the UBTI rules: where the UBTI
rules were enacted in reaction to the specter of unfair competition, the
unrelated debt-financed income rules were passed in reaction to abusive
transactions facilitated by an entity’s tax exemption.44 Although the original
incarnation of UBTI generally excluded passive income, it did include
“certain rents on property acquired with borrowed funds.”45 In including
these specific rents in UBTI, Congress intended to prevent certain taxmotivated sale–leaseback transactions.
In an offending sale–leaseback transaction, a tax-exempt entity would
simultaneously purchase property (generally real estate) from a taxable
person and lease it back to the seller.46 The seller–lessee would treat any
gain on the sale of property as a capital gain, taxable at a lower rate than
ordinary income, while continuing to use the property in its business.47 In
addition, the seller–lessee could deduct its rental payments.48 By entering a
sale–leaseback, a seller–lessee could significantly reduce her taxable
income.49
Sale–leasebacks would not be a problem for tax purposes if the
purchaser–lessor were taxable. In general, however, a taxable entity would
be unwilling to facilitate a sale–leaseback transaction because the rental
payments, deductible to the seller–lessee, would constitute taxable income
to the purchaser–lessor.50 A tax-exempt entity, however, is indifferent to the
entities to change their investment strategies from “politically embarrassing active investments . . . into
passive investments more consonant with the symbolic meaning that sustains the charitable exemption.”
Id. at 1547.
44
See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 38–39 (1950) (listing three reasons that sale–leaseback
transactions involving tax-exempt entities are suspect).
45
Suzanne Ross McDowell, Taxing Leveraged Investments of Charitable Organizations: What is
the Rationale?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 709 (1989).
46
William L. Cary, Sale and Lease-Back of Corporate Property, 27 HARV. BUS. REV. 151, 151
(1949).
47
McDowell, supra note 45, at 709. In some cases, the tax result was even better: if the property
had depreciated, the seller could realize a loss on the property without actually disposing of it. Cary,
supra note 46, at 160–61.
48
Cary, supra note 46, at 159.
49
Economically, deducting the rental payments allowed the seller–lessee to depreciate the property
for tax purposes, which was advantageous especially where the property was land or had buildings for
which little depreciation had been permitted. See William L. Cary, Corporate Financing Through the
Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18
(1948).
50
A sale–leaseback transaction does not actually require a tax-exempt facilitation party; anybody
who is tax-indifferent would do. Tax-indifferent parties include tax-exempt entities but also include, for
example, corporations with tax loss carryforwards that cannot be used before the carryforwards expire,
as well as foreign persons not subject to taxation in the United States. Shu-Yi Oei, Beyond Economic
Substance: Interrogating the Full Impacts of Third-Party Relationships in Tax Shelter Cases, 13 U. PA.
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receipt of taxable income. Moreover, the tax-exempt purchaser–lessor faces
very little risk: it borrowed the majority of the purchase price and repaid its
debt, plus interest, out of the rental income it received from the seller–
lessee.51 And in return for its facilitating the sale–leaseback, the tax-exempt
entity keeps the amount of rental payments it receives in excess of its
payments on the debt.52
A sale–leaseback transaction does not create unfair competition with
taxable entities any more than any other type of rent would. Instead, sale–
leaseback transactions presented a problem separate and distinct from the
problem the UBTI regime had been enacted to prevent. Because sale–
leaseback transactions reduced the net amount of tax paid, they threatened
the corporate tax base.53 But while the potential harm differed from the
harm targeted by the unrelated business income tax, the transactions
targeted by both the UBTI and the unrelated debt-financed income rules
involved tax-exempt entities. Thus, presumably, Congress decided to attack
both problems using the unrelated business income tax.54
In order to prevent abusive sale–leaseback transactions, Congress
included a portion of income earned on a “supplement U” lease within the
definition of UBTI.55 A supplement U lease was defined as a lease of real
property with a term of more than five years where the tax-exempt entity

J. BUS. L. 383, 384–85 (2011) (“Shelter transactions represent instances of exceptionally aggressive
relationship formation, and in many shelter transactions one sees taxpayers purposefully creating and
entering into contracts and relationships with tax-exempt entities, tax-indifferent foreign entities,
insurance companies, banks, and other entities in order to generate favorable tax consequences.”).
51
See McDowell, supra note 45, at 709. Land cannot be depreciated for tax purposes, so a sale–
leaseback of land created depreciation out of whole cloth. Moreover, even if the property were a
building, as long as a relatively small amount of depreciation had been permitted on the building, the
deductible rental payments acted as accelerated depreciation. See Cary, supra note 49, at 18.
52
See Cary, supra note 46, at 154. Although the slice of rental payments that the tax-exempt entity
kept was small as compared with the total size of the transaction, it generally provided a high rate of
return on the tax-exempt entity’s actual unlevered investment. For example, in 1945, Union College
purchased property from Allied Stores Corporation for $16,150,000. Cary, supra note 49, at 3. Of that
amount, Union College borrowed $16 million, meaning it only invested $150,000 of its own money. Id.
at 4. Its return (i.e., the margin between the rent it received from Allied Stores and the amount it paid to
service its debt) would therefore be a return on a $150,000 investment, not a $16 million investment.
Even a small margin would “represent an extraordinarily high percentage return upon the nominal
outlay.” Cary, supra note 46, at 154. Moreover, at the end of the thirty-year term of the lease, Union
College would own the property outright. Id.
53
See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Harvard, Hedge Funds, and Tax Havens: Reforming the Tax Treatment
of Investment Income Earned by Tax-Exempt Entities, 29 VA. TAX REV. 695, 711 (2010) (“Other
possible objectives of imposing the UBIT on non-debt-financed income include . . . preventing erosion
of the corporate tax base . . . .”).
54
See Stone, supra note 40, at 1520 (“Given the very real threat to federal tax revenues represented
by leasebacks and bootstraps, it is tempting to dismiss the anomalies of Congress’ unfair competition
rhetoric and conclude that Congress and the Treasury acted against ‘unfair competition’ in
1950 . . . because they were really trying to shut down tax avoidance schemes.”).
55
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, 949 (amending I.R.C. § 422(a)(4)).
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had borrowed money to acquire the real property.56 In spite of Congress’s
enactment of these rules, tax-exempt entities “continued to enter sale and
lease-back transactions.”57 They just changed the form by including a third
party or leasing the assets for a five-year term.58 Although the IRS tried
administratively to extend the supplement U lease to the new transactions,59
the Supreme Court held that Congress had considered the abusive
transactions and had responded “with precise provisions of narrow
application.”60 Because the new sale–leaseback transactions were outside of
the scope of the provisions enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court
determined that they were not affected by the provisions from 1950.61
Because of the Supreme Court’s decision and tax-exempt entities’
continuing ability to use their exemptions in ways Congress did not intend,
Congress, in 1969, expanded the reach of the unrelated business income
tax.62 It enacted the unrelated debt-financed income rules, imposing a tax
not only on tax-exempt entities’ proceeds from sale–leaseback transactions,
but also on all of a tax-exempt entity’s income related to borrowed money.
C. Structuring Hedge Funds to Accommodate Tax-Exempt Investors
As a result of the unrelated debt-financed income rules, tax-exempt
entities that invest in hedge funds invest almost exclusively in offshore
hedge funds, which are generally organized as corporations in a tax haven
jurisdiction.63 These offshore hedge funds are referred to as “blocker”
corporations.64 In order to understand why tax-exempt entities would invest
in tax haven hedge funds, it is necessary to take a short discursion through
the structure of hedge funds and other private investment funds.

56

Id. § 301(a), 64 Stat. at 950–52 (amending I.R.C. § 423).
McDowell, supra note 45, at 710.
58
Id. at 710–11.
59
Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 C.B. 128, 128–30.
60
Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579 (1965).
61
Id.
62
See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS & S. COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG., TAX REFORM
STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 26 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter TAX REFORM STUDIES].
63
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 10, at 258 (“And so tax-exempts invest almost exclusively in
offshore funds.”).
64
See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development
Deductions?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 29, 52 (2009) (“Both foreign and U.S. tax-exempt institutions demand
covenants that give them no taxable business income. They also ask for blocker corporations between
the business and the investor to prevent their seeing any taxable income.”); Chris William Sanchirico,
The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It
Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1077–78 n.16 (2008) (“If necessary, the tax-exempt organization can use
an offshore ‘blocker’ corporation in a no- or low-tax jurisdiction . . . .”); Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,”
Stoppers,” and the Entity Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1, 5 (2010) (“The most frequent use of the
terms ‘blockers’ or ‘stoppers’ are for investments in intermediate entities by tax-exempt
organizations . . . .”).
57
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Private investment funds such as hedge funds are “actively managed
investments that pool investors’ capital in order to acquire, own, and trade
one or more of securities, commodities, and financial products.”65 Hedge
funds and other investment funds are generally structured as pass-through
entities for tax purposes.66 As pass-through entities, the hedge funds
themselves are not subject to tax.67 Instead, investors pay taxes on their
share of the fund’s income as if the investors had earned that income
directly.68 Structuring the fund as a pass-through entity thus prevents
investors’ returns from being taxed twice: first when earned by the hedge
fund and then a second time when distributed to the investor.69
Although structuring investment funds as pass-through entities reduces
taxable investors’ taxes, this pass-through structure presents significant
problems to potential tax-exempt investors. Private investment funds face
no legal restrictions on their use of borrowed money (i.e., leverage),70 and
their investment strategy often involves borrowing in order to, among other
things, increase their return on investment.71 Under the unrelated business
income tax, tax-exempt entities are treated as if they had directly earned not
only the income and losses of a pass-through entity in which they invest,
but also any UBTI (including unrelated debt-financed income) earned by
that pass-through entity.72 As such, if a tax-exempt entity invests in a passthrough entity, such as a hedge fund, and the hedge fund borrows money to
make investments, a portion of the tax-exempt entity’s income from the
hedge fund will be taxable to the tax-exempt entity as unrelated debtfinanced income.73
UBTI does not, however, pass through corporations.74 In order to
accommodate tax-exempt investors, hedge funds will often create a parallel
65

Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 323, 324
(2007).
66
See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investment Fund Managers Using a Simplified Mark-to-Market
Approach, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 84 (2010) (“Private investment funds are generally organized
as limited partnerships.”).
67
See I.R.C. § 701 (2006).
68
See id. § 702(a).
69
See, e.g., Summer A. LePree, Taxation of United States Tax-Exempt Entities’ Offshore Hedge
Fund Investments: Application of the Section 514 Debt-Financed Rules to Leveraged Hedge Funds and
Derivatives and the Case for Equalization, 61 TAX LAW. 807, 809 (2008) (“[Pass-through] structure
prevents hedge fund income from being subject to two levels of tax, which would be the case if the
funds were organized as United States corporations.”).
70
Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor
Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 245 (2009).
71
Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 202.
72
§ 512(c)(1).
73
Treas. Reg. § 1.514(c)-1(a)(2) ex. 4 (as amended in 1980); see generally I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
96-51-001 (June 27, 1996) (explaining that debt-financed taxable income passes through partnerships).
74
See Philip S. Gross, Tax Planning for Offshore Hedge Funds—the Potential Benefits of Investing
in a PFIC, 21 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS 187, 188 (2004) (“[I]f a U.S. tax-exempt investor invests in an
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fund in a tax haven jurisdiction that is treated as a corporation for U.S. tax
purposes.75 The offshore fund will not owe taxes in its country of
incorporation,76 and because it is a non-U.S. corporation, it will also not
owe taxes in the United States.77 Moreover, it blocks any UBTI (including
unrelated debt-financed income) from passing through to the tax-exempt
investors. Therefore, in order to avoid paying taxes on their passive income
attributable to leveraged investment funds, tax-exempt entities frequently
invest through the offshore hedge fund.
II. TAX HAVENS AND HEDGE FUNDS
A. Using Tax Havens to Evade Taxes
There are a number of ways taxpayers can use tax havens to reduce or
eliminate their liability for taxes. Among other things, taxpayers can hide
money in offshore accounts and they can use a foreign corporation to defer
and reduce their taxes.78 The abusive use of tax havens by U.S. taxpayers
costs the government between $40 billion and $70 billion annually in lost
tax revenue.79 Tax-exempt entities, however, have no need to engage in any

offshore hedge fund (which is classified as a corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes), none of
the U.S. tax-exempt investor’s income from the fund would be UBTI even if the fund uses
leverage . . . .”).
75
The parallel offshore fund “either ‘feeds’ the primary fund as a single investor or coinvests
directly in the underlying portfolio companies with the primary fund.” Andrew W. Needham, A Guide to
Tax Planning for Private Equity Funds and Portfolio Investments (Part 1), 95 TAX NOTES 1215, 1218
(2002).
76
See, e.g., Micah A. Levy, Impact of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 on the Internal
Revenue Code Section 956(c)(2)(A) Exception from U.S. Property for “Deposits with Persons Carrying
on the Banking Business,” 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 295, 301 (2005) (“[C]ertain foreign
corporations that resided in tax havens could retain and reinvest their annual income without being taxed
at the entity level. Consequently, the value of an interest in such a foreign corporation was not
diminished by an annual corporate tax.” (footnote omitted)).
77
See I.R.C. § 11(d) (2006) (narrowing the income of a foreign corporation that the United States
may tax).
78
Other ways taxpayers can take advantage of tax havens include income blending (which can
increase a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit), loss allocation, and transfer pricing. Adam H. Rosenzweig,
Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 960 n.112 (2010).
79
See TREASURY, TAX GAP, supra note 7, at 4. In order to combat taxpayers hiding assets offshore,
the government requires a U.S. taxpayer to disclose on her tax return any interest she earned during the
course of the year in any financial account, including a bank account, in a foreign country. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN SCHEDULE B (2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sb.pdf. In addition, she would be required to file a
report with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue if she had an interest in a foreign financial institution
worth more than $10,000. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (2011). Failure to declare and pay taxes on income
can subject a taxpayer to civil and criminal penalties, see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(3) (civil penalties),
7201 (criminal penalties), as can failure to accurately file an FBAR. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321 (civil penalties),
5322 (criminal penalties).
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of these abusive behaviors. Because they do not pay taxes, they do not need
to hide, defer, or reduce their income.
In many tax haven jurisdictions, the government and the banks offer
little, if any, information to the U.S. government about the financial
activities of U.S. taxpayers there.80 As a result, some taxpayers hide assets
in offshore bank accounts.81 While U.S. taxpayers can legally deposit
money in offshore bank accounts, the law requires them to declare and pay
taxes on their foreign deposits.82 Some banks located in tax havens have
helped U.S. taxpayers open overseas bank accounts and structure those
accounts in a way such that the taxpayers remain invisible to the U.S.
government.83 Some even provide financial services to those taxpayers in a
manner that prevents the U.S. government from finding out about those
bank accounts.84
Although a taxpayer may prefer to pay no taxes at all, even deferring
the payment of her taxes provides a significant economic benefit.85 Absent
any antiabuse provision or significant administrative costs, rational U.S.
taxpayers would generally make their investments through corporations
organized in tax haven jurisdictions. Because those corporations would be
treated as foreign corporations for U.S. purposes, they would not be subject
to U.S. tax on their worldwide income. Instead, they would be taxable on
certain income derived from sources in the United States86 and any income
that was effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.87
Many types of investment income earned by a foreign corporation are
either not treated as U.S.-source income or are exempted from U.S.
taxation. For example, capital gains earned by a nonresident are treated as

80

See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 7, at 956 (“And equally important to U.S. investors, the Cayman
Islands government and Cayman financial institutions provide only limited information to the U.S.
government about activities of U.S. investors there.”).
81
See Lee A. Sheppard, The IRS’s PFIC Amnesty, 128 TAX NOTES 1097, 1097 (2010) (“Forget
little old ladies with untouched inherited Swiss bank accounts. Many of the tax scofflaws who confessed
their sins to the IRS during the recent voluntary disclosure initiative . . . were rich investors hiding
behind anonymous foreign corporations.”).
82
Id.
83
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 3 (2008), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
84
Id.
85
See, e.g., Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic
Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 334 (2004) (“The possibility of deferring taxes on income earned
abroad until repatriation confers a valuable benefit on U.S. multinationals operating in low-tax foreign
jurisdictions.”).
86
I.R.C. § 881(a) (2006).
87
Id. § 882(a)(1). Under a safe harbor provision, though, trading in stocks and securities by a
foreign corporation (or other foreign person) does not constitute a U.S. trade or business unless the
foreign person has an office or fixed place of business in the United States. Id. § 864(b)(2).
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foreign-source income even if the property sold was located in the U.S.,88
and returns earned on certain financial instruments by a foreign corporation
are also treated as foreign-source income.89 In addition, foreign corporations
are not taxable by the U.S. on portfolio interest or interest on bank deposits
that they earn.90 To the extent that the foreign corporation earns U.S.-source
interest, dividends, or other investment income that is taxable by the United
States, it is taxed on that income at a flat 30% rate.91
As a result, it would often be advantageous for a U.S. taxpayer with
significant investment income to form a corporation in a tax haven
jurisdiction that imposes no income tax.92 Whenever the investor wanted to
make an investment, she would contribute money to the foreign
corporation, which the foreign corporation would then invest. Because the
tax haven jurisdiction does not impose a tax, the foreign corporation would
not be subject to any foreign taxes on its income. Moreover, because the
corporation would be a foreign corporation, it would not be subject to U.S.
tax on its capital gains or a potentially significant portion of its interest
income. Finally, since corporations are separate taxpayers from their
shareholders, the U.S. investor would not be taxable on the foreign
corporation’s gains until she realized the gain, either by receiving a
dividend or by selling her shares of the corporation.
Tax deferral is advantageous to taxpayers and harmful to the
government. Under time-value-of-money principles, “[t]he right to $1 today
is more valuable than the right to $1 one year from today, by the amount
that could be earned by investing $1 for one year.”93 Therefore, a taxpayer
generally prefers to defer her payment of taxes while the government
prefers to receive payment earlier. This not only lowers the government’s
revenue from the first investor, but it violates the basic principle of
horizontal equity that similarly situated people should pay a similar amount
of tax.94
88

See id. § 865(a)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b)(2) (1991) (stating that generally, income from notional principal
contracts is sourced to the residence of the taxpayer).
90
I.R.C. § 871(h)–(i).
91
Id. § 881(a).
92
For example, the Cayman Islands have no corporate income tax. ERNST & YOUNG, THE 2010
WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 162 (2010), available at http://www2.eycom.ch/publications/
items/tax/2010_worldwide_corporate_tax_guide/2010_EY_worldwide_corporate_tax_guide.pdf.
93
Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral
and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REV. 565, 565 (1983).
94
Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L.
REV. 1, 49 (2002) (“Horizontal equity dictates that similarly situated taxpayers should be treated
similarly, meaning that taxpayers within the same ability to pay range should bear equivalent tax
burdens.”). Congress has enacted a number of regimes in order to eliminate the advantages of investing
through offshore corporations. Currently, the principal regimes are the subpart F rules and the PFIC
rules. See supra note 8. The subpart F rules were enacted specifically to attack the problem of tax
deferral and other “‘tax haven’ devices.” S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 78–79 (1962). Under subpart F, certain
89
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Table 1 illustrates the difference between the investment returns of two
investors, each of whom initially invests $100, and each of whom earns a
10% return on her investment. Investor A invests without any current tax
(e.g., through a tax haven corporation). At the end of year five, she
repatriates her earnings and pays tax at a rate of 35% on her gain. Investor B
pays tax annually on her gains at a 35% rate and reinvests the after-tax
amount. At the end of year five, Investor A has earned a total return of
almost 40%, while Investor B has earned a total return of about 37%; by
virtue of deferring her taxation until the end of the five-year period,
Investor A has earned over 2.5 percentage points more, after taxes, on her
investment.95
TABLE 1
Initial Investment
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Tax (at 35%)
Net Gain

Investor A Investor B
$100.00
$100.00
$110.00
$106.50
$121.00
$113.42
$133.10
$120.79
$146.41
$128.65
$161.05
$137.01
$21.37
$0.00
$39.68
$37.01

It is important to note that the amount of tax savings that deferral
provides varies with the length of the investment and the investor’s return.96
Compare Table 2, which demonstrates various after-tax returns enjoyed by
Investor A, the deferring taxpayer, with Table 3, which demonstrates the
lower after-tax returns available to Investor B, who pays taxes on her gain
annually. As the expected return and the expected duration of the
investment increase, the value of deferral increases significantly. If a
taxpayer invests $100 and earns a 5% return for twenty years, she will end
U.S. shareholders of controlled foreign corporations are required to include in their gross income their
pro rata share of the corporation’s subpart F income, whether or not such income is distributed to them.
§ 951(a)(1). In essence, the subpart F rules transform a foreign corporation into a pass-through entity
with respect to certain types of income, eliminating the deferral that the corporate form would otherwise
provide U.S. investors. The PFIC rules, on the other hand, subject shareholders of a PFIC to a punitive
interest regime on unusually large distributions and on the sale of their shares. § 1291(a). By requiring
shareholders to pay interest on their deferred income, the PFIC regime eliminates the economic
advantages to the shareholders of deferring the payment of tax. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
95
Note that these numbers only apply if Investor B pays taxes out of her investment return. If she
pays her taxes out of other income, her money will grow in the same way Investor A’s money grows.
However, paying her taxes out of other income reduces that income which, in turn, reduces the amount
of consumption she can enjoy.
96
I am indebted to Professor Thomas Brennan at Northwestern University School of Law for
highlighting this point.
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up with $17.88 more if she is able to defer her payment of taxes until the
end. Similarly, if she invests the $100 and can obtain a 25% return, after
only five years she will have $12.50 more if she can defer her taxes.
Deferral has real value to investors so, to the extent they can, it makes
economic sense for them to invest through tax havens.
TABLE 2: INVESTOR A

Returns

Years
5

10

15

20

5%

$117.96

$140.88

$170.13

$207.46

10%

$139.68

$203.59

$306.52

$472.29

15%

$165.74

$297.96

$563.91

$1,098.82

20%

$196.74

$437.46

$1,036.46 $2,526.94

TABLE 3: INVESTOR B

Years

Returns

5

10

15

20

5% $117.34

$137.69

$161.57

$189.58

10% $137.01

$187.71

$257.18

$352.36

15% $159.23

$253.54

$403.71

$642.82

20% $184.24

$339.46

$625.43

$1,152.31

B. Tax-Exempt Investments in Tax Haven Corporations Are #ot Evasive
In some ways, a tax-exempt entity’s ability to avoid taxes, including
UBTI, by investing through an offshore blocker corporation looks
indistinguishable from a U.S. taxpayer’s abusive use of a tax haven
corporation. Absent the offshore blocker corporation, the tax-exempt entity
would presumably have invested in a leveraged hedge fund (that is, a hedge
fund that had borrowed money), so some portion of its income would
consist of unrelated debt-financed income, and it would owe taxes on that
amount. On the other hand, if the tax-exempt entity had tried to block its
unrelated debt-financed income by investing through a domestic
corporation, the tax-exempt entity would not earn unrelated debt-financed
income and would not owe taxes. The corporation, however, would pay
taxes on its income at a 35% rate.97 The corporation’s taxes would indirectly
reduce the tax-exempt entity’s return.98 By investing through a tax haven

97

See § 11(b)(1)(D) (imposing a rate of 35% if the taxable income exceeds $10 million).
That is, if a tax-exempt entity owned 10% of the outstanding equity of a corporation and the
corporation earned $100, the tax-exempt entity’s share would be $10. However, if the corporation owed
taxes at a 35% rate, the corporation would only have earned $65 after taxes, and the tax-exempt entity’s
98
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corporation, though, the tax-exempt entity can almost entirely avoid directly
or indirectly paying taxes.
Such reduction, however, does not rise to the level of inappropriate tax
evasion by tax-exempt entities. Judge Learned Hand famously wrote that a
taxpayer “may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes,”
provided the transaction is “within an exception of the tax law.”99 And,
under current law, a tax-exempt entity’s use of a tax haven blocker
corporation to avoid UBTI is clearly within an exception of the tax law. The
subpart F and PFIC antiabuse provisions, enacted to prevent taxpayers from
taking advantage of tax haven jurisdictions,100 explicitly carve tax-exempt
entities out of their scope.101
But tax-exempt entities’ ability to make investments that are
effectively leveraged is not just a matter of a technical reading of the
antiabuse provisions. There are situations in which the tax law expressly
permits a tax-exempt entity to invest in an investment fund that borrows
money. For example, tax-exempt entities can invest in mutual funds.102
Although not true pass-through entities for tax purposes, the tax treatment
of mutual funds eliminates the second level of taxation and treats them as
quasi-pass-through entities.103 While the Investment Company Act of 1940

share would be reduced to $6.50. Effectively, by investing in a taxable U.S. corporation, the tax-exempt
entity has indirectly paid the tax it would have owed if it were not exempt.
99
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
100
See supra note 8.
101
Although the Treasury Regulations do not say so explicitly, they imply that subpart F income
earned by a tax-exempt entity is not treated as UBTI, and therefore, the tax-exempt entity is not taxable
on its subpart F income. The PFIC regulations are more explicit: the PFIC rules only apply to taxexempt entities if a dividend from the PFIC would be UBTI even absent the PFIC rules (e.g., if the taxexempt entity borrowed money in order to purchase the PFIC shares). Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-1(e)(1) (as
amended in 2004).
102
See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry:
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 198 (2007) (“In 2005, more than half of all
mutual fund assets were held in tax-deferred accounts or tax-exempt funds, more than 60% of all fund
shareholders invest through tax-deferred accounts, and nearly 60% view tax-deferred retirement plans as
their primary source for purchasing funds.” (footnote omitted)).
103
John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 595–96 (2009) (“[U]nlike most corporations,
a mutual fund is taxed only on the amount of earnings it retains. To get this specialized ‘pass through’
tax treatment, a mutual fund must meet requirements . . . under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue
Code.”). Essentially, if a mutual fund qualifies as a regulated investment company under I.R.C. § 851, it
can deduct from its taxable income the amount of dividends it paid to shareholders. See I.R.C.
§ 852(b)(2)(D) (2006). Shareholders, in turn, are not required to treat all of the mutual fund dividend as
ordinary income; instead, the character of the income in the hands of the mutual fund passes through to
the shareholders. See, e.g., § 852(b)(3)(B).
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limits the amount of leverage a mutual fund can employ,104 mutual funds
can borrow money.105 Some mutual funds even act like hedge funds, trying
to replicate hedge-fund strategies and returns and employing leverage to the
extent the law permits.106 Even to the extent that mutual funds act like
leveraged hedge funds, though, UBTI does not pass through mutual funds
to their tax-exempt investors.107
In addition, tax-exempt entities can invest in certain financial
instruments that effectively provide a leveraged return without requiring a
tax-exempt entity to formally borrow money.108 Such implicit leverage is
not, however, treated as unrelated debt-financed income. An option, for
example, allows an investor to pay a small upfront amount (an “option
premium”) for the right to purchase or sell a security at a set date for a set
price.109 An option provides “an element of leveraged profit potential
because the purchase price of the option is likely to be a fraction of the
value of the underlying security.”110 However, UBTI does not include gains
recognized by tax-exempt entities on options.111

104
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)–(g) (2006) (prohibiting closed-end funds from issuing debt securities
without sufficient asset coverage).
105
See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 28–29 (2006)
(“Registered investment companies, mutual funds, on the other hand, may use leverage but they operate
under direct limits.”).
106
See Davidoff, supra note 71, at 235 (“These funds employ ‘hedge fund like’ trading strategies
and employ leverage and hedging to the extent permitted under the Investment Company Act.”).
107
See James R. Brown Jr., Commodity-Linked Instruments and the Proper Scope of Mutual Fund
Taxation, 112 TAX NOTES 505, 513 (2006) (“[A] distribution from a [regulated investment company] is
generally not UBTI . . . even if the distribution is attributable income that is UBTI . . . .”).
108
See generally LePree, supra note 69, at 834–39 (discussing short sales, options, futures
contracts, and notional principal contracts). Leverage magnifies the volatility of an investment,
essentially increasing an investor’s potential gain and potential loss. John Hughes, Jing Liu & Jun Liu,
On the Relation Between Expected Returns and Implied Cost of Capital, 14 REV. ACCT. STUD. 246, 254
(2009). This magnification of the potential risk and reward inherent in leverage occurs because an
investor is earning a return on more money than he personally has at risk. Assume that an investor has
$100 to invest. If he invests that $100 in one share of stock and, by the end of the year, that stock
appreciates to $105, he has earned a 5% return on his investment. If, however, he still has $100 to invest
but in addition borrows $100, he can buy two shares of stock. At the end of the year, his stock will be
worth $210. If he were to sell the stock, he could pay back the loan and still have $110 (ignoring, for
purposes of this example, any interest he had to pay)—a return of 10 %! Although he still only had $100
of his own money at risk, using leverage, he was able to double his return. It is important to note,
however, that while leverage multiplies an investor’s gains if he has gains, it also multiplies his risks. An
investor’s equity will be wiped out much more quickly if the investment goes wrong. See LePree, supra
note 69, at 808–09.
109
See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Elective Taxation of Risk-Based Financial Instruments: A
Proposal, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 7 (2007).
110
Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 2002 (1995).
111
I.R.C. § 512(b)(5)(B) (2006) (“There shall also be excluded [from UBTI] all gains or losses
recognized, in connection with the organization’s investment activities, from the lapse or termination of
options to buy or sell securities . . . or real property . . . .”).
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Likewise, short sales do not create unrelated debt-financed income
unless the tax-exempt entity actually borrows money in order to
consummate the sale.112 In a short sale, the seller sells stock that she does
not actually own, instead borrowing the stock to deliver it to the buyer.113
Short sales “allow an investor to increase both risk and reward by
magnifying the gain or loss relative to the investor’s initial financial outlay”
in the same way that a leveraged investment, taxable as unrelated debtfinanced income, increases the risk and return of an investment.114
Tax-exempt entities can also enter into equity swaps—financial
instruments in which two parties agree to make periodic payments to each
other.115 The amount of the payments is based on an objective financial
reference.116 Because swaps require no initial financial payment, they
provide investors with an effectively leveraged return.117 In spite of their
implicit leverage, though, swaps also do not produce UBTI.118
Blocker corporations can and do employ leverage in making their
investments. Generally speaking, they borrow to the same extent as the
onshore funds that pass unrelated debt-financed income through to taxexempt entities.119 If the purpose of the unrelated debt-financed income
rules were to prevent tax-exempt entities from employing leverage, blocker
corporations should also trigger a tax-exempt investor’s recognition of
UBTI. But the IRS has directly addressed the question of whether blocker
corporations pass UBTI through to tax-exempt shareholders. In a number of
rulings, the IRS has looked at a tax-exempt entity that formed and
capitalized a foreign corporation, which in turn invested in a leveraged
partnership and distributed its income from the partnership to the taxexempt entity. After analyzing the transaction, the IRS ruled that the tax-

112

Rev. Rul. 95-8, 1995-1 C.B. 108.
See, e.g., Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law #ew Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1315, 1322 n.27 (1997).
114
LePree, supra note 69, at 835.
115
See, e.g., Don M. Chance, Equity Swaps and Equity Investing, 7 J. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS
75, 75 (2004).
116
See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 109, at 8.
117
Chance, supra note 115, at 90 (“An equity swap is leveraged. There is no initial outlay . . . . By
paying an interest rate, whether fixed or floating, an equity swap appears to be similar to a leveraged
position in equity.”).
118
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1992) (“[I]ncome from notional
principal contracts [i.e., swaps] . . . shall be excluded in computing unrelated business taxable income.”).
119
Andrew W. Needham, A Guide to Tax Planning for Private Equity Funds and Portfolio
Investments (Part 2), 95 TAX NOTES 1381, 1388 (2002) (“If a tax-exempt entity invests directly in a
hedge fund, it may realize a portion of its gains as UBTI, assuming that the hedge fund borrows to fund
investments. If the entity instead invests in the hedge fund through a Blocker, the Blocker will earn the
leveraged returns.”).
113

244

106:225 (2012)

Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments

exempt entity would not recognize any UBTI as a result of its indirect
investment in the leveraged partnership.120
The problem with tax-exempt entities’ use of leverage, then, cannot be
the leverage itself; tax-exempt entities earn tax-free returns on a wide range
of investments in leveraged investment funds—as long as the fund is
structured as a corporation rather than a partnership—and in financial
instruments that provide a leveraged return. Instead, the purpose of the
unrelated debt-financed income rules must be to prevent the abusive
behaviors in which Congress believed tax-exempt entities were engaging.121
Likewise, the problem with tax-exempt entities investing in tax haven
blocker corporations cannot be the tax-avoidance motive of the tax-exempt
entities. Because tax-exempt entities are not generally subject to tax, they
do not face the same incentives as taxable persons to evade taxes by hiding
their assets or deferring their income in tax haven jurisdictions. Rather, their
use of tax haven jurisdictions fits the technical contours of the tax law and
is anticipated and condoned by the tax law and the IRS. Tax-exempt
entities’ use of tax haven jurisdictions is therefore not abusive. While
Congress may have legitimate reasons for preventing U.S. persons from
putting their money in tax haven companies, the fact that tax-exempt
investors invest through tax havens is not one of them.122
C. Permitting Tax-Exempt Entities to Invest In Hedge Funds Does #ot
Harm Society
Any discussion of the mechanics and taxation of tax-exempt entities’
investment in hedge funds should address the normative question of
whether tax-exempt entities should be permitted to invest in hedge funds in
the first instance. Popular discourse is schizophrenic when it comes to
hedge funds: they are alternatively lionized and vilified.123 If we believe that
tax-exempt entities should serve the public good, it makes sense to ensure
that their permissible investments also contribute to the public welfare.

120

See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-51-016 (Sept. 23, 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-51-017 (Sept.
23, 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-51-018 (Sept. 23, 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-52-086 (Sept.
30, 1999).
121
See supra Part I.B.
122
For example, one commentator has argued that distributions by foreign corporations to taxexempt entities should be included in UBTI. His argument, however, is not that tax-exempt entities are
abusing the tax system by investing in offshore corporations. Instead, he asserts that “[i]f a tax-exempt
U.S. investor invests in a foreign corporation that is exempt from U.S. corporate income tax, there may
be a marginal investment incentive to invest uniquely American capital outside the United States.”
Robert H. Dilworth, Federal Income Tax Reform: International Recommendations, 129 TAX NOTES
1113, 1121 (2010). Encouraging U.S. persons to keep their capital invested in the United States may be
an appropriate Congressional purpose, but it is the design of the unrelated debt-financed income rules
that, in the first instance, incentivizes tax-exempt entities to invest through tax haven corporations.
123
See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 66, at 79.
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And arguably, hedge funds provide value both to their investors and to
society at large. Hedge funds provide tax-exempt entities with a way to
diversify their portfolios while earning a larger return on their investment
than they otherwise might be able to earn.124 In addition, hedge funds
provide liquidity to the public markets.125 Liquidity is “a public good with
positive externalities for all traders,”126 and its provision should be
encouraged. Moreover, tax-exempt entities themselves provide the markets
with significant capital investment.127 In 2006, tax-exempt entities’
investments were estimated to represent slightly more than one-third of all
worldwide investments in hedge funds;128 if those assets were pulled, hedge
funds’ ability to provide liquidity would be significantly impaired.
Whether hedge funds provide positive externalities or not, however,
the tax law should not casually change the rules underlying investment
decisions of taxpayers. There is no explicit assertion, in either the
legislative history of the unrelated debt-financed income rules or the current
debates surrounding tax havens, that tax-exempt entities should not invest
in hedge funds. In addition, there is nothing implicit in the unrelated debtfinanced income rules or the current debates suggesting that tax-exempt
entities should not invest in hedge funds.129 Absent an indication that
Congress intends to prevent tax-exempt entities from investing in hedge
funds, then, the tax law should minimize the extent to which it prevents
them from doing so.
D. Other Investors in Tax Haven Blockers
Although tax-exempt entities’ investments in offshore funds are not
abusive, tax-exempt entities are not the only investors in offshore hedge
funds. Some investors are non-U.S. persons who want to avoid subjecting

124

Cauble, supra note 53, at 704–05 (“Tax-exempt entities invest in these funds in order to
diversify their investment portfolios and earn high returns on their investment.”).
125
See Carole Comerton-Forde et al., Time Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market-Maker
Inventories and Revenues, 65 J. FIN. 295, 325 (2010) (“Clearly, there are other competing liquidity
suppliers, such as market makers on regional exchanges, proprietary trading desks at various Wall Street
firms, and hedge funds following a market-making strategy.”).
126
Id. at 326. It is necessary not to overstate the importance of liquidity. “[B]eyond a certain point,
increased liquidity may have costs which exceed its benefits.” Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P.
Summers, The Case for a Securities Transactions Excise Tax, 48 TAX NOTES 879, 883 (1990). Still,
until that point, liquidity is a valuable public good, and the existence of hedge funds that stand ready to
buy and sell securities helps maintain liquid markets.
127
Taylor, supra note 64, at 6 (“Tax-exempt organizations, and in particular section 401(a) trusts
and section 401(k) plans, are an important source of capital market investments.”).
128
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 258 (excluding funds of funds).
129
See generally Cauble, supra note 53, at 720–22 (noting that the unrelated debt-financed income
rules are typically justified as preventing oversubsidization of tax-exempt entities and preventing sale–
leaseback transactions).
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themselves to U.S. taxation.130 Others, though, are U.S. taxpayers. In spite
of the Code’s antiabuse rules, an investment through an offshore fund may
be advantageous in certain circumstances to some small portion of U.S.
taxpayers,131 particularly where an investor anticipates an outsized return.132
But offshore hedge funds do not just facilitate better returns for honest
investors: they also provide anonymity to investors, making it easier for
U.S. taxpayers to evade taxes.133
Hedge fund managers may also prefer to manage offshore hedge funds.
While they can no longer defer their fee income for tax purposes,134 being
offshore nonetheless has significant advantages. Offshore hedge funds can
avoid state partnership fees, minimize their tax shelter reporting
requirements, and avoid state taxation.135 Moreover, in order to avoid being
governed by the Investment Company Act of 1940, a hedge fund organized
in the United States must have fewer than 100 investors.136 A hedge fund
incorporated outside of the United States has no such limitation.137
Attacking the viability of offshore corporations as investment vehicles
would certainly hurt tax-exempt investors. Their returns would be reduced
by the amount of taxes that the offshore fund would suddenly be required to
pay. Even if the tax-exempt entity were to try to reduce its tax by shifting
its investment to an onshore hedge fund, it would still have to pay some
amount of tax and, in addition, would face the administrative burden of

130

See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, #ot All Carried Interests Are Created Equal, 29 Nw. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 713, 747 n.155 (2009). Foreign investors in U.S. private equity funds may want a blocker in
order to avoid “potential U.S. tax liabilities and myriad U.S. tax filing requirements. With an investment
in a single U.S. fund, a non-U.S. investor can find itself filing returns and paying tax not just to the IRS
but also to dozens of states and even some cities.” Neil Marcovitz & Christian M. McBurney, Canadian
Private Equity Fund Investors and Choice of Entity for a U.S. Blocker, 113 J. TAX’N 214, 214 (2010). In
the private equity context, however, blockers are generally domestic entities treated as corporations for
tax purposes. Id. at 215. Because such blockers would be subject to taxes at ordinary corporate rates, it
suggests that non-U.S. investors are more interested in avoiding U.S. tax filing requirements than in
avoiding U.S. taxes altogether.
131
See Gross, supra note 74, at 191 (“While an investment in a PFIC . . . generally connotes bad
things from a tax perspective, surprisingly, they actually can be good tax planning vehicles in certain
circumstances.”).
132
Id. at 194.
133
See Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Offshore Explorations: Caribbean Hedge Funds,
Part 1, 118 TAX NOTES 95, 95 (2008). Anonymity facilitates tax evasion because “if income is not
independently reported by the source, the likelihood of voluntary compliance declines precipitously.”
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 255. And offshore hedge funds do not report their shareholders’ income to
the IRS. Sheppard & Sullivan, supra at 95.
134
See Rosenzweig, supra note 130, at 748.
135
Gross, supra note 74, at 193–94.
136
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).
137
See Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the #eoliberal
Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1605 n.135 (1999).
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filing a return with the IRS.138 Moreover, tax-exempt entities’ need to avoid
UBTI is used to legitimize the existence of offshore hedge funds.139 Taxexempt entities are generally viewed positively as providing public goods.140
Without tax-exempt investors to protect, the raison d’être for offshore
hedge funds becomes significantly less sympathetic, especially in light of
the potential abuses they can foster.141

138
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.511-3(b) (1958), 1.6012-2(e) (as amended in 2007) (requiring tax-exempt
entities to file a Form 990-T for any year in which they receive $1000 or more of UBTI). The
administrative burden of filing a Form 990-T may be substantial. The IRS estimates that the average
time required to file a Form 990-T is about 142 hours, including the time necessary for recordkeeping,
learning about the law or the form, preparing the form, and sending it to the IRS. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-T 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990t.
pdf.
139
See, e.g., Offshore Tax Issues: Reinsurance and Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Suzanne Ross McDowell, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP)
(“At first blush, blocker entities look like a loophole that should be shut down. However, blocker entities
are frequently used to avoid the application of the debt-financed income rules to legitimate, nonabusive
transactions that were not the intended target of the rules.”); id. at 13 (statement of Daniel S. Shapiro,
Partner, Shulte, Roth, & Zabel) (“From a tax policy standpoint, there appears to be little basis for
imposing UBIT on passive investment income received by tax-exempt organizations where it has no
liability for the leverage, has no control over the investments, or the extent of the use of leverage.”); id.
at 14 (statement of Dr. Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy, Government and Finance
Division, Congressional Research Service) (“Indeed, when questioned by a reporter about the use of
offshore entities, a spokesman for Duke University stressed the use of endowments for financial aid and
research.”).
140
See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation for #onprofit
Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997) (“I believe that
fundamentally the case for tax exemption, as well as other special tax and non-tax benefits for nonprofit
organizations, must rest squarely, and more or less exclusively, on the view that the activities these
organizations engage in merit public support. . . . [T]he organizations are providing public goods or
engaging in activities that have positive externalities.”).
141
Clearly, U.S. tax-exempt entities are among the most important and the most sympathetic
investors in offshore hedge funds. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 258. But non-U.S. investors should be
similarly sympathetic—like U.S. tax-exempts, they are not taxable in the U.S., except on income
effectively connected with a U.S. business and on certain of their U.S.-source income. See I.R.C.
§§ 871, 881–82 (2006). Of course, a foreign investor does not eliminate the taxation of its U.S.-source
income by investing through a blocker corporation; instead, the blocker corporation faces taxation, and
the foreign investor’s return is reduced by the same amount as if the foreign investor had invested
directly. Still, foreign investors generally prefer to invest in the U.S. through a foreign corporation
because that allows the foreign investors to remain anonymous to the IRS and because it allows them to
avoid any duty to file a U.S. return. Sheppard & Sullivan, supra note 133, at 98 (“Foreign investors
prefer to invest in the United States through corporations because their anonymity is preserved and
because they are not required to file a U.S. tax return unless they have something else going on.”). But
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would not necessarily hurt U.S. investment by non-U.S. persons.
Instead, foreign investors could set up their own blocker corporations in tax haven countries. Because a
foreign investor’s blocker would presumably be managed in the foreign investor’s home jurisdiction, it
would continue to provide the anonymity that foreign investors desire.
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III. THE DEBATE OVER THE UNRELATED DEBT-FINANCED INCOME RULES
Commentators generally dislike the application of the unrelated debtfinanced income rules to tax-exempt entities’ hedge fund investments.142
They point out that the UBTI and unrelated debt-financed income
provisions of the Code were enacted before tax-exempt entities earned
substantial income from investment partnerships.143 As a result of these
rules, tax-exempt entities’ investment decisions, especially decisions
regarding investment in hedge funds, private equity funds, and real estate
investment partnerships, face significant distortions.144 The unrelated debtfinanced rules were not intended to prevent tax-exempt entities from
investing, and hedge fund investments do not present the problems that the
rules intended to solve.145 Moreover, the congressional proposal to treat
foreign corporations that are managed domestically as domestic
corporations will further introduce distortions into tax-exempt entities’
investment decisions without providing a material corresponding increase
in federal revenue.146
In reaction to these problems, commentators have proposed two
modifications of the tax law that would eliminate the distortions in
investment decisions faced by tax-exempt entities. The first proposal would
entirely repeal the unrelated debt-financed income rules.147 Without the
unrelated debt-financed income rules, tax-exempt entities could invest in
onshore hedge funds irrespective of the funds’ borrowings. The second
would keep the unrelated debt-financed income rules but amend the tax law
so that unrelated debt-financed income does not pass through investment
partnerships to a passive tax-exempt partner.148 Repealing the pass-through
of unrelated debt-financed income would “mitigat[e] distortions that
142
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 64, at 16 (“Certainly the use of blockers to avoid debt-financed
income points up the need to consider revisiting the debt-financed acquisition rules that . . . by general
consensus, are both overbroad and too narrow.” (footnote omitted)).
143
See Cauble, supra note 53, at 700.
144
See, e.g., id. at 700, 723.
145
LePree, supra note 69, at 846 (“What [the unrelated debt-financed income rules] were not
designed to do is to protect the charities themselves, which were not seen as being threatened in any
way.”).
146
Cauble, supra note 53, at 723. The proposal is unlikely to raise significant revenue because taxexempt entities can avoid taxation by shifting their investments out of hedge funds and into unleveraged
investment vehicles. Id. This distortion could result in an inefficient allocation of capital, however, if,
but for the tax law, the tax-exempt entity would have invested in the hedge funds. Id.
147
LePree, supra note 69, at 848.
148
Cauble, supra note 53, at 723–24; LePree, supra note 69, at 851. It is worth noting that, of the
two solutions, repealing the unrelated debt-financed income rule is both the cleanest and the easiest. Just
repealing the unrelated debt-financed income rule would not, however, address the distortions that arise
because active business UBTI passes through investment partnerships, while preventing all UBTI from
passing through qualifying investments partnerships would address both issues. This Article is solely
concerned with leveraged passive investments by tax-exempt entities, however, and whether active
business income should pass through investment partnerships to tax-exempt entities is beyond its scope.
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influence investment decisions made by tax-exempt entities” while
modernizing the tax law to reflect the economic realities of tax-exempt
entities in the modern economy.149
Although either solution would eliminate the distortions that the
unrelated debt-financed income rules cause, the goal of preventing
distortions does not seem to motivate congressional critics of tax havens. In
fact, the goal of eliminating distortions relating to tax-exempt entities may
not be compelling to Congress. Instead, Congress wants to discourage the
use of tax haven jurisdictions. While ending the pass-through of unrelated
debt-financed income earned by passive partners would eliminate taxexempt entities’ need to invest through blocker corporations organized in
tax haven jurisdictions, it would do nothing to discourage them from doing
so.
A. The Unrelated Debt-Financed Income Rules Distort Tax-Exempt
Entities’ Legitimate Investment Decisions
A good tax system interferes minimally with taxpayers’ economic
decisionmaking. An ideal tax system would raise revenue without distorting
taxpayers’ actions in comparison with how the taxpayers would have acted
in a world without taxes.150 Distortions are bad because they change what an
actor would do in a tax-free world; in the interest of efficiency, the tax law
tries to minimize the effect that taxes have on taxpayers’ decisions.151
But tax-exempt entities are, by their very nature, subject to significant
distortions of their behavior. In order to qualify for an exemption, for
example, tax-exempt entities cannot be organized in order to earn a profit,
and net earnings cannot inure to the benefit of shareholders.152 In addition,
149

Cauble, supra note 53, at 724.
See Yoram Margalioth, Note, The Case for Tax Indexation of Debt, 15 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 205,
254 (1998) (“The standards for a good tax system are its efficiency and its fairness. By the term
efficiency we generally mean minimal interference with economic behavior to allow the allocation of
economic resources to their most productive uses.” (footnotes omitted)).
151
Samuel D. Brunson, Grown-Up Income Shifting: Yesterday’s Kiddie Tax Is #ot Enough,
59 KAN. L. REV. 457, 460 (2011).
152
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (2006) (exempting from tax “[c]lubs organized for pleasure,
recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder.”). Notwithstanding the general rule that an organization must forgo profits in
order to be exempt from tax, there is nothing inherent about tax-exempt entities that demands they not
be profit-oriented. Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner argue that not only do for-profit charities (such as
Google.org) exist, but that they should get some of the tax benefits currently enjoyed only by non-profit
charities. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2020
(2007). With or without the tax benefits, though, it is becoming easier and easier to organize a for-profit
charity. Several states permit a limited liability company “to become a low-profit limited liability
company . . . when organized for a business purpose and operated to significantly further charitable
purposes but without a significant purpose to produce income or asset appreciation.” Carter G. Bishop,
The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV.
243, 243 (2010).
150
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tax-exempt entities often face significant limitations on how they can act.
All but an insubstantial part of a public charity’s actions, for example, must
further its charitable purpose,153 and the law severely curtails public
charities’ rights to engage in political speech.154
In a world without the income tax, certain charitable entities might
choose to distribute profits to their shareholders, to split their actions
between charitable and noncharitable, or to fully exercise their right to
political speech. Perhaps there is something inherent to tax-exempt entities
that, even absent tax considerations, suggests that the types of entities that
qualify for exemption from the federal income tax should not be able to do
these things. It is far from clear, however, that these restrictions naturally
adhere to tax-exempt entities.155 Whether or not such activities are
appropriate for tax-exempt entities, forgoing them is arguably the cost of
being removed from the tax rolls.156
If the rules regarding profits and net earnings, permissible actions, and
political participation of tax-exempt entities are conceptualized as the cost
of being tax-exempt, it may be that the UBTI and unrelated debt-financed
income rules can also be considered costs of an entity’s tax exemption.
There is, admittedly, a much more tenuous link between problems with
debt-financing and the nature of a tax-exempt entity than there is between
an entity’s use of its resources and its nature, but it is still plausible to argue
that avoiding UBTI is a cost of the tax exemption. If that is true, the fact
that some piece of anti-tax-haven legislation will distort the behavior of taxexempt entities is not a compelling argument against that legislation.
Instead, it just increases the cost to tax-exempt entities of their exemption.
B. Congress Did #ot Intend to Tax Tax-Exempt Entities on Their
Investment Income
The argument for changing the tax treatment of tax-exempt entities’
investment income, then, must supplement the distortions argument. Taxexempt entities have been removed from the familiar world of economic
decisionmaking by deliberately circumscribing the decisions they are
permitted to make. Because of this, any argument in favor of preserving
tax-exempt entities’ ability to invest through investment funds organized as
153

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
155
See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to Enforce
the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 141–42 (2011) (“Just because a public charity
engages in certain activities that are not themselves charitable in nature, it does not mean that those
activities should cause the public charity to cease being considered a charitable entity. This is
particularly true when . . . the activity that is not inherently charitable is closely connected to, and in
furtherance of, the public charity’s core charitable purpose.” (footnote omitted)).
156
See id. at 130 (“The beneficial tax treatment available to public charities is not costless to the
charities, however. The tax law imposes certain restrictions on the way a qualifying public charity can
act.”).
154
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partnerships should, instead of (or in addition to) focusing on distortions,
focus on accomplishing the purposes underlying the exemption from tax of
tax-exempt entities’ passive income.
When Congress first enacted the unrelated business income tax, it
deliberately removed passive income from the scope of the tax. As
discussed above, Congress enacted the unrelated business income tax in
order to “correct certain problems which have arisen in connection with taxexempt organizations.”157 However, Congress believed that tax-exempt
entities’ passive income should not be subject to tax as UBTI “where [the
passive income] is used for exempt purposes because investments
producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as proper for
educational and charitable organizations.”158 Moreover, unlike the active
conduct of a business, Congress believed that tax-exempt entities’ passive
investments “are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable
businesses having similar income.”159
But although Congress recognized that it was generally appropriate for
tax-exempt entities to invest passively and that such investment did not
harm taxable businesses, it proved itself willing to subject tax-exempt
entities’ passive income to taxation where it determined that such passive
income was somehow abusive or anticompetitive. At the same time
Congress generally affirmed that passive income was not subject to the
unrelated business income tax, it carved out income earned as rent from
certain sale–leaseback arrangements.160
Congress had three objections to tax-exempt entities’ participation in
sale–leaseback transactions. First, Congress did not believe that sale–
leaseback transactions constituted ordinary passive income. Instead, the taxexempt entity was “trading on its exemption, since the only contribution it
makes to the sale and lease is its tax exemption.”161 Second, Congress was
concerned that if sale–leasebacks went unchecked, eventually tax-exempt
entities would “own the great bulk of the commercial and industrial real
estate in the country.”162 Third, Congress believed that tax-exempt entities’
profits on the sale–leaseback transactions came because they were selling
part of their exemptions.163 Congress did not believe, however, that these
problems attached to ordinary passive investments by tax-exempt entities;
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H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 36 (1950); see supra Part II.B.
H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 38.
159
S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 30–31 (1950).
160
McDowell, supra note 45, at 709.
161
S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 31.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 31–32 (“This can occur either by the exempt organization paying a higher price for the
property or by charging lower rentals than a taxable business could charge.”).
158
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they solely tainted passive rents earned as a result of sale–leaseback
transactions.164
The Treasury Department highlighted two main problems with
permitting tax-exempt entities to participate in the modified sale–leaseback
transactions. First, because the acquisition indebtedness would be repaid
from property’s future earnings and because the tax-exempt owner would
not be taxable on those future earnings, tax-exempt entities would be able to
pay “a considerably higher price than other purchasers can afford.”165 This
concern corresponds roughly to Congress’s concern in 1950 that, if
unchecked, sale–leaseback transactions would lead to tax-exempt entities
owning substantially all of the commercial and industrial real property in
the United States.166 The Treasury Department’s second concern was
unrelated to the earlier Congress’s motivations for including income from
supplement U leases167 in UBTI. Instead, the Treasury Department worried
that the income from sale–leaseback transactions would allow tax-exempt
entities to grow “independent of the amount of contributions . . . which they
receive from the public.”168 Rather than focusing on the sale or trading of
their exemptions, the Treasury Department wanted to ensure that taxexempt entities had to rely on public support rather than becoming selfreliant as a result of their leveraged investments.
The history of the unrelated debt-financed income rules clearly
demonstrates that Congress did not enact them in order to cause tax-exempt
entities to be taxable on their passive income. Rather, it enacted the rules to
prevent tax-exempt entities from facilitating other taxpayers’ abusive taxreduction strategies.169 Although the unrelated debt-financed income rules
do transform some passive income earned by tax-exempt entities into
taxable income, their aim was not to change the default rule that passive
income is exempt from tax. Moreover, the debt-financed income rules were
not, by their terms, limited to passive income earned by tax-exempt
entities.170
Still, some current members of Congress are wary of the use of tax
haven jurisdictions by U.S. persons, whether the U.S. persons are taxable or
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See id. at 32.
TAX REFORM STUDIES, supra note 62.
166
See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 39 (1950).
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See supra notes 55–56.
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TAX REFORM STUDIES, supra note 62.
169
Id. at 42 (stating that unrelated debt-financed income rules would “not have any immediate
significant overall revenue effect” but instead would “prevent substantial future revenue losses.”).
170
In their actual application, however, the unrelated debt-financed income rules principally would
have caused a portion of passive income to become taxable; tax-exempt entities that were operating
active businesses were subject to the unrelated business income tax whether or not they borrowed
money.
165

253

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

tax-exempt.171 Any solution to the use of tax havens can have an effect on
tax-exempt entities’ passive income; although the tax exemption for passive
income has a long history, the enactment of the unrelated debt-financed
income rules (and, for that matter, the enactment of the unrelated business
income tax in the first place) demonstrate that, if Congress believes that taxexempt entities are behaving badly, it is willing to curtail the amount and
type of income a tax-exempt entity can earn without paying taxes.
Although Congress did not originally intend for the unrelated debtfinanced income rules to be anything but an antiabuse provision, one could
argue that over the years their meaning has shifted. Members of Congress
have recently expressed displeasure with the size of some tax-exempts,
especially university endowments.172 However, congressional displeasure
appears to focus on universities hoarding, instead of spending, their
endowments rather than on the size of the endowments.173
Moreover, if Congress is concerned with tax-exempt entities growing
too large as a result of investing with borrowed money, the unrelated debtfinanced income rules as currently written are a poor method of preventing
such growth. As discussed above, they only prevent tax-exempt entities
from incurring debt. The unrelated debt-financed rules do not set a limit on
how large a tax-exempt entity can grow. They do not limit the return a taxexempt entity can receive, as long as that return is not the result of
borrowed money. And tax-exempt entities can still increase their risk and
return through the use of various effectively leveraged financial instruments
and investments in mutual funds and offshore hedge funds.174 If Congress
cares about the size of tax-exempt entities, it should address the problem
directly rather than relying on provisions of the tax law that were never
intended to do that work.
C. Fixing the Unrelated Debt-Financed Income Rules Would #ot Eliminate
the Abusive Use of Tax Havens
Even if a tax-exempt entity were not subject to the unrelated debtfinanced income rules, a risk-averse tax-exempt entity may still prefer to
make its hedge fund investments through an offshore blocker corporation.
Professor Emily Cauble has proposed that tax-exempt entities should
generally be permitted to make passive investments in leveraged
171
For example, Senators Carl Levin and Kent Conrad have introduced legislation that would
“tighten rules that allow hedge funds and corporations in the United States to skirt federal taxes by
opening shell companies overseas.” David Kocieniewski, Senate Bill Seeks to Raise Revenue by Closing
Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 13, 2011, at B5.
172
See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, Exempt Organizations Faced Challenges, Opportunities in 2008,
122 TAX NOTES 50, 53 (2009) (“Grassley hammered schools with large endowments for not using more
of their funds on tuition assistance.”).
173
See id.
174
See supra notes 102–18 and accompanying text.
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partnerships without facing UBTI liability.175 She argues that this would
eliminate distortions that tax-exempt entities face without undermining the
goals that led to the enactment of the UBTI rules.176 Professor Cauble’s
proposal necessarily includes a control test; under her proposal, an
investment fund would only pass UBTI through to a tax-exempt investor if
that investor owned 50% or more of the fund.177 A tax-exempt entity
investing passively may be concerned, however, that other partners could
redeem their interests, and that the tax-exempt partner would become a
majority interest holder, albeit unintentionally.
Moreover, the reason to premise the exemption from UBTI on limiting
a tax-exempt entity’s control of the partnership is to make sure that the taxexempt entity does not cause the investment partnership to facilitate abusive
transactions. Because the interests of taxable investors run contrary to the
interests of tax-exempt entities with respect to abusive tax-motivated
transactions, ensuring that the tax-exempt entity does not control the
investment partnership discourages investment funds from participating in
abusive transactions.178 To the extent that Congress is serious about using
the UBTI and unrelated debt-financed income rules to prevent abusive
behavior by tax-exempt entities, it would be in Congress’s interest not to
adopt Professor Cauble’s proposal wholesale but instead to limit the
exception from the UBTI rules to a partnership where the sum of the
interests of all tax-exempt entities together is less than 50% of the
outstanding partnership interests. However, a group of tax-exempt partners
would have parallel incentives; even if no single tax-exempt partner had
owned more than 50% of the interests in the partnership, the results would
be similar if two or more controlled more than 50% of the partnership. If
Congress were instead to adopt a rule limiting the exception to UBTI to
partnership where less than 50% of the interests were held by any taxexempt investor, individual tax-exempt entities would have even less ability
to ensure that the limit was not exceeded.
Moreover, tax-exempt entities may have non-tax reasons for investing
in an offshore fund. Admittedly, a tax-exempt entity’s return on its
175

Cauble, supra note 53, at 723–24.
Id. at 724.
177
Id. at 725.
178
If a tax-exempt entity controlled the investment partnership, it could enter into a sale–leaseback
with a taxable person. For example, the taxable person might sell a manufacturing plant to the
partnership for $100,000, which the partnership would borrow from a bank. The partnership would pay
annual interest of 5% to the bank. The partnership would then lease the building back to the taxable
person for $7000 a year. The partnership would pay $5000 to the bank, but would receive $7000 in rent,
for a net gain of $2000. Meanwhile, the taxable person would get deductions worth $7000 a year. The
tax-exempt entity would be willing to facilitate this transaction, because it would not pay any taxes on
its gains. Taxable investors, on the other hand, may not want the additional taxable income, and could
balk at the transaction. By ensuring that tax-exempt entities do not control the partnership, Congress
would prevent the tax-exempt entity from forcing taxable partners to accept additional taxable income.
176
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investment through an offshore corporation may be reduced by taxes. Even
though an offshore hedge fund is generally organized in a tax haven country
that does not impose taxes on the hedge fund, a portion of its U.S.-source
income may be taxable, and U.S. payers may be required to withhold that
tax upon payment.179 A partnership, on the other hand, does not itself pay
taxes and, to the extent that the tax law was changed to exempt from UBTI
income earned through a passive investment in a partnership, the taxexempt investor would also not pay taxes. In practice, however, hedge
funds can significantly limit the amount of U.S.-source income they earn
that is subject to withholding. There is no withholding imposed on a foreign
corporation’s capital gains,180 for example, or on portfolio interest earned by
a foreign corporation.181 And where income that could be earned by foreign
hedge funds could have been subject to withholding, the foreign hedge
funds often try to structure their investment in such a way as to fall outside
the scope of the withholding rules.182 In practice, then, taxes are unlikely to
materially diminish a tax-exempt entity’s return earned through a foreign
hedge fund as compared with the return earned through a domestic hedge
fund.
Ultimately, although the proposals discussed above183 provide a
sensible treatment of tax-exempt entities’ investments in investment funds,
they do not address Congress’s concern about taxpayers’ use of tax havens
to avoid paying taxes. Certainly, tax-exempt entities’ investments in
offshore hedge funds do not implicate the abuses that Congress would like
to eliminate, but nothing about allowing tax-exempt entities to invest in
leveraged partnerships without facing taxes would require them to shift
their investments from offshore to onshore investment funds. Moreover,
even if no tax-exempt entity could own more than 50% of a partnership, if
tax-exempt entities collectively held most or all of the interests in an
investment partnership, that partnership could again engage in abusive
transactions that the unrelated debt-financed income rules were intended to
prevent.
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I.R.C. §§ 881(a), 1441(a) (2006).
Gains on the sale of property by a nonresident of the United States are treated as foreign-source
income. Id. § 865(a)(2). As such, they are not subject to withholding. See id. § 1441(a) (requiring
withholding on payments of U.S.-source income to nonresident alien individuals).
181
Id. § 871(h)(1).
182
Prior to 2010, for example, “many foreign-based hedge funds avoided withholding taxes on
dividends by instead holding total return equity swaps on the equity of U.S. corporations.” Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, The Redemption Puzzle, 128 TAX NOTES 853, 854 (2010). In 2010, Congress enacted I.R.C.
§ 871(m), which treats certain “dividend equivalent payments” as if they were dividends from sources
within the United States. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 541(a),
124 Stat. 71, 115 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 871(m)).
183
See supra notes 147–49.
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IV. REPLACING THE UNRELATED DEBT-FINANCED INCOME RULES WITH
THE REPORTABLE TRANSACTION REGIME
Congress has a pressing interest in shutting down abusive behavior by
U.S. taxpayers taking advantage of the low taxes and the general secrecy of
tax havens. However, if it enacts antiabuse legislation without taking into
account tax-exempt entities’ legitimate use of tax haven blocker
corporations, the legislation will detrimentally affect tax-exempt entities.184
As such, should Congress circumscribe the ability of U.S. persons to use tax
haven corporations, it should also provide an alternative route for taxexempt entities to invest in hedge funds. Because the unrelated debtfinanced income rules significantly distort the investment decisions of taxexempt entities without providing any significant societal benefit, they
should be repealed. At the same time, in order to prevent some taxpayers
from taking advantage of tax-exempt entities’ tax exemptions in order to
evade taxes, the Treasury Department should expand the definition of
“reportable transactions” to include such abusive behaviors.
A. Repeal the Unrelated Debt-Financed Income Rules
The simplest way to allow tax-exempt entities to continue to invest in
hedge funds would be to repeal the unrelated debt-financed income rules.
Their repeal alone would not necessarily cause tax-exempt entities to move
their investments from tax haven hedge funds to onshore hedge funds, but
Congress may enact anti-tax-haven legislation—such as the Stop Tax
Havens Abuse Act (which would treat offshore hedge funds that are
controlled in the United States as domestic corporations)—that would cause
tax-exempt entities to take their investments out of offshore blocker
corporations.185
Repealing the unrelated debt-financed income rules, in conjunction
with or separate from closing tax haven loopholes, could, however, create
other tax problems. The impetus for the unrelated debt-financed income
rules was to prevent tax-exempt entities from facilitating tax-evasive
184
See Cauble, supra note 53, at 699 (“[T]he enactment of currently proposed legislation regarding
the use of ‘blocker corporations’ could exacerbate this capital allocation problem, at least in the hedge
fund context.” (footnote omitted)).
185
If an offshore corporation that was controlled in the United States was treated as a domestic
corporation for tax purposes, the offshore corporation would owe U.S. taxes, notwithstanding its being
incorporated in a tax haven. Corporations pay taxes at a top marginal rate of 35%, with no lower rate
imposed on capital gains or other types of income. I.R.C. § 11 (2006). Although tax-exempt entities
would still pay no taxes when they received distributions from the offshore hedge fund by virtue of their
exemption, any distribution would be 35% less than the amount of money initially earned by the hedge
fund. An onshore hedge fund, in contrast, is generally organized as a partnership and would not pay
entity-level taxes. Moreover, absent some type of UBTI, the tax-exempt entity will not pay taxes when
the partnership earns the money or when it distributes the money. Therefore, if taxes were imposed on
offshore hedge funds, tax-exempt (and, for that matter, taxable) investors should generally migrate to
onshore hedge funds.
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behavior by U.S. taxpayers, and specifically to end sale–leaseback
transactions.186 As we have seen, when Congress first tried to stop sale–
leaseback transactions, taxpayers tweaked the form of the sale–leaseback in
order to reduce their taxes.187 And even after the unrelated debt-financed
income rules were passed, taxpayers restructured their sale–leaseback
transactions to continue using tax-exempt entities’ exemptions to reduce the
taxes they paid.188
Why have the unrelated debt-financed income rules been unable to
prevent these transactions? In part, because the rules only focus on
penalizing the tax-exempt entity for facilitating tax avoidance.189 While the
taxable party to the transaction compensates the tax-exempt entity for
facilitating tax avoidance, the taxable party enjoys the real benefit; for
purposes of the taxpayer, tax-indifferent parties are roughly fungible.190
Taxable persons, who enjoy real financial benefit from lowering their tax
bills, will continue to have an incentive to use tax-exempt and taxindifferent entities to reduce their tax bills as long as they have no risk of
being penalized as a result. And tax-exempt entities have very little
incentive to avoid facilitating transactions that do not create UBTI even if
the taxable counterparty uses their exemptions.191
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See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
188
Stone, supra note 40, at 1521. Initially, taxpayers found non-exempt counterparties who were
tax-indifferent (because, for example, they had a loss that they would be unable to fully use) to whom
they could sell property and then lease it back. As the Treasury and Congress worked to shut down these
sale–leaseback transactions through what would become the passive activity loss rules, taxpayers
reversed the sale–leaseback transactions so that tax-exempt entities would lease their assets to the
taxable person, who would then lease the property back to the tax-exempt seller but keep the accelerated
depreciation. Id. at 1522. When Congress responded, the parties tweaked the transaction again so that
the tax-exempt entity (or, increasingly, the municipality) would sell assets to the taxable person, who
would lease them back, keeping only the depreciation deductions. Id. at 1522.
189
See id. at 1523 (“Nonetheless, in formulating a legislative response, neither the Treasury nor
Congress ever considered any approach that would tax the person trying to avoid tax. Instead, they
reflexively focused on eliminating charities’ special ability and incentive to facilitate the avoidance.”).
190
They are not, of course, completely interchangeable solely as a result of being exempt from tax.
A taxable person would have to take into account different counterparty risk with respect to each taxexempt entity. Counterparty risk is the risk that one party to a transaction may not be paid because the
other party becomes insolvent, declares bankruptcy, or becomes otherwise unable or unwilling to pay
amounts it owes. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation:
International and Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 608 n.105 (2010). But one taxexempt entity’s exemption functions the same as the next entity’s.
191
A tax-exempt entity that facilitated shady tax transactions could potentially suffer reputational
damage among donors and the public at large, but even if this were the case, the risk of reputational
damage does not appear to have prevented tax-exempt entities from acting as facilitation parties to
questionable transactions.
187
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B. Meeting the Goals of the Unrelated Debt-Financed Income Rules
Through Other Means
The five concerns laid out by Congress and the Treasury Department
that eventually led to the enactment of the unrelated debt-financed income
rules can be divided into two categories: (1) concerns about unfair business
practices and (2) concerns about tax avoidance. The ensuing years have
demonstrated that the unfair-business-practice concerns have not
materialized, which allows any new rule to focus instead on preventing tax
avoidance.
1. Unfair Business Practices.—Congress and the Treasury
Department worried that if tax-exempt entities could engage in sale–
leaseback and other leveraged transactions, they would ultimately own a
significant portion of real estate, would be willing and able to pay a higher
price for investments than taxable persons, and would be able to fund
themselves through their investments rather than relying on outside
contributions.192 Ultimately, these concerns have proven to be unfounded.
In certain instances, tax-exempt entities are still able to purchase real
property with borrowed money. In 1980, Congress permitted certain taxexempt entities, primarily pension funds, to borrow money to purchase real
property.193 Among other things, proponents of allowing pension funds to
make leveraged investments in real property argued that because of
inflation, the government needed to facilitate pension funds’ investment in
real property.194 Although the Treasury Department argued that debt
financing was conventional in, but not essential to, real estate investment, it
did not ultimately oppose the change.195 As a result, since 1980, pension
funds have been able to make leveraged investments in real property
without being taxed on income from the leveraged property.
In spite of their ability to use borrowed money to purchase real
property, pension funds remained underinvested in the real property sector.
Various studies have indicated that pension funds should allocate 20% or
more of their assets to real property investments in order to improve their
diversification and increase their risk-adjusted return.196 In spite of their
ability to borrow and this optimal allocation, however, pension funds hold
between 3.5%–4% of their assets in real property.197 Although other tax-
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See supra notes 162, 165–68 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(A) (2006); McDowell, supra note 45, at 714.
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McDowell, supra note 45, at 714.
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Id. at 714–15.
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See Brian A. Ciochetti et al., Determinants of Real Estate Asset Allocations in Private and
Public Pension Plans, 19 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 193, 193 (1999); Richard M. Ennis & Paul
Burik, Pension Fund Real Estate Investment Under a Simple Equilibrium Pricing Model, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., May/June 1991, at 20, 20.
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See supra note 196.
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exempt entities may act differently than pension funds, it appears unlikely
that removing their constraint on borrowing will cause tax-exempt entities
to acquire a significant portion of the U.S. real estate market.
In theory, tax-exempt entities could pay higher prices for investment
assets than similarly situated taxable investors. A tax-exempt entity can
afford to pay a higher price because it can purchase assets with untaxed
money. Assume, for example, that a tax-exempt entity and a taxable
corporation both want to purchase the same asset. Assume further that each
earns $100 with which to buy the asset. The taxable corporation has to pay
taxes on the $100 and is left with $65 of after-tax income. As such, the most
the taxable corporation can pay for the asset is $65. The tax-exempt entity,
on the other hand, can bid up to $100 for the same asset. The ability of a
tax-exempt entity to outbid taxable persons, however, derives from the taxexempt entity’s exemption from tax, not from its ability to borrow money.198
Unless the existence of a tax exemption is offensive, the ability to borrow
does not create any additional pricing unfairness that the unrelated debtfinanced income rules prevent.
Finally, Congress never explicitly endorsed the Treasury Department’s
concern that leveraged investments would allow tax-exempt entities to
eschew public support.199 Even assuming that Congress shares this concern,
however, such a concern is unfounded. Tax-exempt entities already earn
significant returns through leveraged, albeit offshore, investment funds.200
Moreover, tax-exempt entities have a wide range of available investments
that offer effectively leveraged returns without creating unrelated debtfinanced income.201 In spite of their ability to earn leveraged returns, taxexempt entities’ investment income has stayed remarkably steady, while the
contributions they receive from the public have increased significantly.202 It
appears from the historical data that the availability of leveraged returns
198

McDowell, supra note 45, at 733 (“Taxation of all income from debt-financed-investment
property would be desirable if borrowing would give tax-exempt investors an advantage over taxable
investors that would enable tax-exempt investors to pay a higher price for an asset . . . . No such
advantage results from the mere act of borrowing.”).
199
Id. at 726–27 (“Congress has never expressly embraced the Treasury Department’s argument
that income from debt-financed property should be taxed so that charities will seek growth through
public support instead of leveraged investments.”).
200
See, e.g., Cauble, supra note 53, at 698–99 (“Educational endowments . . . private employersponsored pension plans, and other tax-exempt organizations . . . invest billions of dollars in hedge
funds, real estate funds, and private equity funds.”).
201
See supra notes 102–18 and accompanying text.
202
In fact, between 1985 and 2004, public charities’ investment income rose from $21.9 billion (in
2004 dollars) to $27.8 billion; in the same time period, the contributions, gifts, and grants received by
public charities rose from $87.6 billion (in 2004 dollars) to $248.6 billion. Paul Arnsberger et al., A
History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 105, 128,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08winbul.pdf. In other words, in 1985, the ratio of public
charities’ revenue from contributions, gifts, and grants to their revenue from investment income was 4:1.
By 2004, that ratio had increased to about 9:1.
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does not cause tax-exempt entities to quit relying principally on public
contributions for their operating revenue.203
2. Tax Avoidance.—Although the unfair-business-practice justifications
for the unrelated debt-financed income rules seem inapplicable, the rules
were also justified on tax-avoidance grounds. As has been discussed,
although the rules are aimed at tax-exempt entities, Congress was not
concerned about tax-exempt entities avoiding taxes.204 By granting them an
exemption, Congress made clear that it intended for tax-exempt entities to
generally remain outside of the reach of the income tax.
Instead, Congress was trying to prevent tax-exempt entities from
facilitating taxable persons’ tax avoidance. And, unlike the unfair business
practices area, leverage is related to tax avoidance. The transactions
facilitated by tax-exempt entities generally have little, if any, actual
economics. The taxable person is not interested in the investment. Instead,
it wants to be able to transfer the incidence of tax that it should pay to an
“accommodation party” that is indifferent to that tax.205 Likewise, the taxexempt entity does not want the risk and reward of an actual investment.
Instead, it wants to earn the fee offered by the taxable person. Because there
is little chance of a pretax profit, these transactions would not occur in a
world without tax. But in a world with taxes, the arbitrage opportunity gives
these riskless transactions real value.206
Borrowing makes these riskless transactions possible.207 If, in the sale–
leaseback transaction, the tax-exempt entity had to spend its own money, it
203

Note, too, that in every year, the amount of “program service revenue” earned by public charities
dwarfed both the contributions they received and their investment income. Id.
204
See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
205
It is worth noting that “there [is] no special connection between leasebacks, bootstraps, and
charities. The promoters were looking for tax-indifferent counterparties and the comprehensive and
permanent nature of the charitable tax exemption served that purpose.” Stone, supra note 40, at 1519.
206
This is essentially the definition of a tax shelter: “[a] deal done by very smart people that, absent
tax considerations, would be very stupid.” Tom Herman, IRS Setbacks in Court Rekindle Debate About
#eed for Tax-Shelter Legislation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A2 (quoting Professor Michael Graetz).
207
It turns out that these leveraged transactions in which tax-indifferent parties make their
exemption available to reduce a taxable person’s tax liability are not entirely riskless. Many transit
agencies had entered into sale-in-lease-out or lease-in-lease-out transactions in which the transit
authorities sold or leased their equipment to taxable persons who, in turn, leased the equipment back to
the transit authorities while taking depreciation deductions that the transit authorities could not take.
Many of the deals were backed by American International Group, Inc., which collapsed in the credit
crisis of 2008, causing the transit authorities to go into technical default and potentially crippling them
financially. See Sam Goldfarb, Auto Bailout with Controversial Tax Provisions Dies in Senate, 121 TAX
NOTES 1222, 1222 (2008). And in some cases, the risk went beyond financial risk. In 2009, a fatal Metro
crash occurred in Washington, D.C. Jesse Drucker & Christopher Conkey, Tax Shelters Slowed D.C.
Metro Upgrade, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2009, at A6. Investigators said that the victims would have had a
better chance of surviving if they had been riding newer trains. Id. The Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority did not replace some of its older trains, however, because it was “constrained by tax
advantage [sic] leases” it had entered into to allow taxable persons to take depreciation deductions. Id.
(quoting the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority).
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would face the risk that its counterparty would be unable (or unwilling) to
make lease payments and the risk that it would be unable to dispose of the
asset it had purchased and leased back at a reasonable price. But to the
extent the tax-exempt entity funds most or all of the purchase price by
taking out a nonrecourse loan, with interest payments at a rate lower than
the lease payments it receives, the tax-exempt entity has no disincentive to
facilitate taxable persons’ tax avoidance. Instead, it has an economic
incentive to facilitate the avoidance.
If the unrelated debt-financed income rules disappeared, tax-exempt
entities would not suddenly start engaging in unfair business practices.
They could, however, return to facilitating the tax avoidance the rules were
passed to prevent, unless a new anti-tax-avoidance rule was passed.
It is worth reiterating that, notwithstanding the unrelated debt-financed
income rules, taxable persons have found ways to use tax-exempt entities’
exemptions, so the unrelated debt-financed income rules have not
functioned as a silver bullet. The proposal I put forward in this Article
should not only successfully prevent tax-exempt entities from engaging
again in sale–leaseback transactions while allowing them to make
legitimate passive investments through leveraged partnership. It should also
provide more protection against other unforeseen transactions whereby
taxable persons use tax-exempt entities in order to avoid taxes.
C. Using the Tax Shelter Rules to Prevent Abusive Behavior by TaxExempts and Their Counterparties
In order to prevent taxpayers from evading taxes by taking advantage
of tax-exempt entities’ exemptions, the Treasury Department should expand
its definition of “reportable transactions.”208 In addition to those transactions
that are currently reportable, any transaction by which a tax-exempt entity
trades or sells part of its exemption should be treated as a reportable
transaction for all parties to the transaction.
In 2004, Congress replaced the old tax shelter rules, which required the
registration of tax shelters, with new rules requiring taxpayers to disclose
their participation of “reportable transactions.”209 “Tax shelters [were]
extraordinarily complex and highly aggressive (though usually not patently
illegal) transactions designed entirely for the purpose of reducing, and in
some cases eliminating, the tax liabilities of large corporate or wealthy
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Reportable transactions are those that the Treasury regulations require participants to disclose to
the IRS as a result of the transactions’ potential for tax avoidance or evasions. I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1)
(2006).
209
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 815(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1581
(2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 6111(a)).
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individual taxpayers.”210 Tax-motivated sale–leaseback arrangements and
other “sales” by tax-exempt entities fit comfortably within this definition.
The term “tax shelter” has now been replaced by “reportable
transaction,” which includes transactions that the Secretary of Treasury
determines have a “potential for tax avoidance or evasion.”211 Currently,
there are five categories of reportable transactions: listed transactions,
confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, certain
loss transactions, and “transactions of interest.”212
The Treasury Department could easily add another category. Although
removing the unrelated debt-financed income rules would require
legislative action, creating a new category of reportable transaction can be
accomplished through the Treasury Department’s authority to promulgate
regulations.213 And it may not even require the formal steps that go into
promulgating regulations. The IRS can identify what constitutes a listed
transaction—itself a subset of reportable transactions—by issuing a notice
“or other form of published guidance.”214
In order to prevent the abuses that the unrelated debt-financed income
rules were originally enacted to address, the new regulations or other
published guidance would have to target transactions that would not happen
absent the ability of a taxable person to take advantage of a tax-exempt
entity’s exemption for a price. The definition would need to be carefully
calibrated; there are legitimate transactions that involve tax-exempt entities
and taxable persons. For example, it is possible for a tax-exempt entity to
purchase an asset from or sell an asset to a taxable person with no taxavoidance motive. Moreover, it is possible for one to lease property to the
other without intending to evade tax. Any rule that discouraged such nontax-motivated transactions would be inefficient, adding distortions of the
type that the rule is designed to prevent.
Based on the various iterations of sale–leaseback and lease–leaseback
transactions that have irked the government, the transactions that should be
targeted are those that share three characteristics. First, the tax-exempt
entity faces no substantial downside risk. The central concern of the
unrelated debt-financed income rules was that tax-exempt entities could
borrow substantially all of the money that they invested in the suspect
transactions. The no-substantial-downside-risk criterion would target the
same class of transactions.

210
Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, #arrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation,
2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 103 (2011).
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§ 6707A(c)(1).
212
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2007).
213
I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1); see also, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 54,615,
54,617 (Sept. 26, 2007) (adding tax patents to the list of reportable transactions).
214
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2007).
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Second, the tax-exempt entity should have no significant expected
return other than the “fee” received. Fee would be defined by substance, not
by form or label. In the sale–leaseback transactions, the targeted fee would
be that sliver by which rent payments to the tax-exempt entity exceeded the
interest and principal payments made by the tax-exempt entity to the lender.
Although not designated a fee, this sliver effectively functions as a flat
amount that the tax-exempt entity earns that is not subject to any risk except
counterparty risk.
Essentially, these two criteria would treat as suspicious any transaction
entered into by tax-exempt entities where there was no material risk and no
chance for profit. Tax-exempt entities are not necessarily organized in order
to make a profit, however.215 A presumption that transactions entered into
without a clear profit motive are abusive could discourage risk-averse taxexempt entities from doing things that would further their purposes but not
necessarily expose them to risk or reward. The third criterion would
confront that problem: to become a reportable transaction, tax evasion must
be a principal purpose for the taxable person’s entering into the
transaction.216 Though not the sole criterion, demonstrating that the taxable
person did, in fact, enjoy a substantial reduction in her taxes as a result of
entering into the transaction, especially absent any significant risk or
opportunity for gain, may provide prima facie evidence that tax evasion was
a principal purpose.217
215
Some commentators have recently proposed that donors to for-profit charities be permitted to
deduct their donations. See Malani & Posner, supra note 152, at 2018–20. However, the traditional, and
more common, intuition is that there is something sacrosanct about providing this extra subsidy solely to
entities that do not have a profit motive. See Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1213, 1215 (2010) (“Thus, I argue here that federal law should continue to insist that only true nonprofit
organizations should be eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions.”).
216
The tax law recognizes the difference between a principal purpose and the principal purpose. For
example, the IRS can disallow the tax benefits of an acquisition where “the principal purpose for which
such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax.” I.R.C. § 269(a). The Senate
Report defines “the principal purpose” to mean that “the evasion or avoidance purpose outranks, or
exceeds in importance, any other one purpose.” S. REP. NO. 78-627, at 59 (1943). The Senate’s rule,
which ultimately was enacted, is more stringent than the rule proposed by the House of Representatives,
which would have required only that “one of the principal purposes for which such acquisition was
made or availed of is the avoidance of Federal income or excess profits tax.” H.R. 3687, 78th Cong.
§ 129(a) (1943). In this case, there is no reason to limit the scope of the antiabuse rule to only those
situations where the single most important purpose is tax avoidance; instead, the effective sale of a taxexempt entity’s exemption should be a reportable transaction if tax avoidance is one of the principal
purposes for entering into the transaction.
217
This third criterion is similar to the codified economic substance test. Under the Code, a
transaction is only treated as possessing economic substance if it changes the taxpayer’s economic
position in a meaningful way and the taxpayer has a substantial non-tax purpose for entering into the
transaction. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124
Stat. 1029, 1067–68 (amending I.R.C. § 7701(o)). The test I am proposing is slightly different than the
economic substance test, especially in its purpose, but a transaction with a tax-exempt entity that would
satisfy the economic substance test should generally not be a reportable transaction under the test
proposed in this Article.
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Moving the prevention of abusive behavior by tax-exempt entities from
the unrelated debt-financed income rules to the reportable transaction rules
has a number of advantages. It would eliminate the distortions and
administrative costs that currently discourage tax-exempt entities from
making investments they would otherwise prefer to make. The reportable
transaction category proposed in this Article is designed to surgically
address the abuses that Congress unsuccessfully attempted to address with
the unrelated debt-financed income rules. As such, tax-exempt entities will
only be discouraged from entering into transactions that had no purpose
outside of the reduction of taxes.218 Moreover, the reportable transaction
rules are not only administered, but are actually drafted, by the Treasury
Department;219 should it turn out that they are too broad or that they have an
undesired distortive effect, the Treasury Department has flexibility to adjust
the rules or carve out transactions that fit within the technical contours of
the rule but lack the abusive purpose.220
In addition, the reportable transaction rules would apply to both the
tax-exempt entity and its taxable counterparty. Because the unrelated debtfinanced income rules do not penalize the taxable person buying the tax
exemption, there is nothing to discourage the taxable person from looking
for a tax-exempt entity willing to sell access to its exemption.221 The

218

Eliminating the unrelated debt-financed income rules would allow tax-exempt entities to invest
directly in U.S. investment funds rather than investing through a tax haven corporation. The investment
would have both downside risk and upside potential for the tax-exempt organization and therefore would
not be a reportable transaction. As such, the demand for tax haven blocker corporations by sympathetic
investors would diminish, if not entirely disappear. Congress could then continue to shut down their
availability with little, if any, backlash.
219
The Treasury Department has broad authority to “prescribe all needful . . . regulations for the
enforcement of” the Code. I.R.C. § 7805(a). Moreover, the Secretary of the Treasury is expressly
granted authority to determine what constitutes a reportable transaction. Id. § 6707A(c)(1). Although the
Treasury Department has to provide public notice and permit the public to comment on regulations, 5
U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006), it has relatively little impediment to creating a new category.
There may be even more flexibility if the abusive transaction were designated a “listed transaction.”
The Treasury Department has delegated the authority to determine what constitutes a listed transaction
to the IRS. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2010). And the IRS is not subject to the public
notice and comment rules that apply to Treasury Regulations. Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr.,
How Revenue Rulings Are Made, and the Implications of that Process for Judicial Deference, 101 J.
TAX’N 230, 230 (2004).
220
See H.R. REP. NO. 109-455, at 125 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234,
321 (“Present law authorizes the Secretary to define a reportable transaction on the basis of such
transaction being of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or
evasion.”).
221
See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. Moreover, because the only penalty to a taxexempt entity is that it pays taxes on a portion of its income, if the tax savings were sufficiently large for
the taxable person, it may be willing to pay a slightly higher fee in order to compensate the tax-exempt
entity both for the use of its exemption and for any taxes paid. In such a case, the unrelated debtfinanced income rules would not serve any prophylactic role.
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reportable transaction rules, on the other hand, impose disclosure
requirements and potential penalties on all parties to a transaction.
The reportable transaction rules require all participants in a reportable
transaction to include a disclosure statement with their tax returns.222 In
order to meet the disclosure requirement, information provided by the
participants in the reportable transaction must, among other things, describe
“the expected tax treatment and all potential tax benefits expected to result
from the transaction” in sufficient detail such that the IRS can understand
the tax structure and the identity of all of the parties to the transaction.223
The penalty for failing to file this disclosure is 75% of the decrease in tax
shown as a result of the transaction.224 In the case of any reportable
transaction other than a listed transaction, the penalty imposed on a
corporation or other entity is capped at $50,000.225 If a corporate participant
fails to report a listed transaction, the penalty is capped at $200,000.226
In addition to the penalties for failure to disclose reportable
transactions, the taxable counterparty faces additional penalties if he
understates his income. In general, taxpayers face a penalty of 20% of the
amount of an understatement of income tax where that understatement was
substantial.227 In order to be “substantial,” a corporation’s understated
income tax must exceed the lesser of 10% of the tax required to be shown
or $10 million.228 There is no substantiality requirement if the underpayment
results from a reportable transaction, however. A 20% penalty is imposed
on any reportable transaction understatement that was properly disclosed,
irrespective of the size of the understatement.229 The penalty increases to
30% if the reportable transaction was not disclosed.230
Tax-exempt entities generally do not have to worry about these
understatement penalties. Because they generally have no income tax
222
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a). The Treasury Regulations define “participation” separately for each
type of reportable transaction. In general, however, “participation” means that a taxpayer’s tax return
reflects a tax benefit from the transaction. Id. § 1.6011-4(c)(3)(1). In the new category, the definition of
participation would have to be expanded, inasmuch as the tax-exempt entity’s tax return would not
reflect any tax benefit. However, for transactions of interest, a taxpayer participates “if the taxpayer is
one of the types or classes of persons identified as participants in the transaction in the published
guidance describing the transaction of interest.” Id. § 1.6011-4(c)(3)(i)(E). The new category of
reportable transaction would need to define participation with reference to either standard.
223
Id. § 1.6011-4(d).
224
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2041(a), 124 Stat. 2504, 2560
(amending I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(1)).
225
Id. (amending § 6707A(b)(2)(B)). The penalty is capped at $10,000 for an individual. Id.
226
Id. (amending § 6707A(b)(2)(A)). This penalty is capped at $100,000 for an individual. Id.
227
§ 6662(a).
228
Id. § 6662(d)(1)(B). If the taxpayer were not a corporation, the penalty would apply if the
understatement exceeded the greater of $5000 or 10% of the tax required to be shown. Id.
§ 6662(d)(1)(A).
229
Id. § 6662A(a).
230
Id. § 6662A(c).
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liability, they are not in a position to understate their liability. The
government claims that its “strategy of specifically labeling promoted tax
shelter transactions as deviant behavior has apparently effectively translated
into an anti-tax-shelter-compliance norm.”231 On the other hand, disclosure
alone may not provide sufficient disincentive to prevent tax-exempt entities
from becoming counterparties to abusive transactions.232 Congress appears
to have recognized that as long as tax-exempt entities do not suffer
economic harm from facilitating abusive tax behavior, there is a chance that
they will enter into these abusive transactions. In order to prevent “tax
shelters [that] depend on the existence of a seller with an exemption from
the tax consequences that would otherwise occur,” it is necessary that
“those tax consequences [be] then resurrected.”233
Additionally, Congress has resurrected the tax consequences for certain
tax-exempt entities that participate in reportable transactions. In general,
tax-exempt entities face penalties if they engage in any “tax shelter
transaction,” which is defined as all listed transactions and certain
reportable transactions.234 The amount of the penalty is the greater of the tax
that would be due on income from the tax shelter transaction (imposed at
the highest rate in effect for corporations) or 75% of the proceeds received
by the tax-exempt entity that are attributable to the tax shelter transaction.235
In addition, a manager of a tax-exempt entity that approves the tax-exempt
entity’s participation in a tax shelter transaction or otherwise causes the taxexempt entity to participate in the tax shelter transaction faces a fine of
$20,000 for each such approval.236 Moreover, these are strict liability
penalties; although the original Senate proposal would have exempted

231
Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the #ew Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance
#orm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 1003 (2006).
232
See id. (“It is conceivable that government officials might make such claims without adequate
evidence, perhaps in order to enhance others’ views of their performance or in order to increase taxpayer
compliance by conveying the impression that most taxpayers comply.”). It is possible that, if these taxavoidance transactions became reportable transactions, the public stigma associated with them would
discourage at least some tax-exempt entities from engaging in them. While the government is generally
not permitted to disclose identifying information from tax returns, § 6103(a), certain tax annual returns
made by tax-exempt entities are made available to the public, § 6104(b). Among the returns required to
be made public is the disclosure a tax-exempt entity must make if it becomes party to a reportable
transaction. §§ 6104(b), 6033(a)(2). Ultimately, however, the issue of whether public stigma alone
would prevent tax-exempt entities from participating in reportable transactions is moot, however,
because Congress also imposed penalties on such behavior.
233
Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 54 SMU L.
REV. 83, 117 (2001).
234
§ 4965(a)(1).
235
Id. § 4965(b)(1)(A). If the transaction becomes a listed transaction after the tax-exempt entity
enters into it, the penalty is paid at the same rate, but is imposed only on income received after the
transaction is identified as a listed transaction. Id. § 4965(b)(1)(A)(i)(II), (ii)(II).
236
Id. § 4965(a)(2), (b)(2).
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entities and managers from the penalty if the participation was not willful or
had reasonable cause,237 the final bill removed these exceptions.238
For these penalties to apply, however, the transactions described in this
Section would have to become listed transactions or Congress would have
to act. Currently, the definition of “tax shelter transactions” only includes
listed transactions, confidential transactions, and transactions with
contractual protection.239 Because this would be a new category of
reportable transaction, it would have to be expressly included in the ambit
of tax shelter transactions, unless the IRS determined it was a listed
transaction.
Repealing the unrelated debt-financed income rules meets the demands
of tax efficiency. Without the specter of paying taxes on income they earn
through pass-through investment funds, tax-exempt investors will be able to
analyze potential investments based on their investment appetite. Their
investment decisions will not be altered as a result of tax considerations. By
combining this freedom for tax-exempt entities with a new category of
reportable transactions to combat tax-exempt entities’ selling the use of
exemptions to taxable persons, the government can meet its revenue and
justice requirements. The government will be able to enact legislation that
limits the usefulness to U.S. taxpayers of tax haven corporations without
adversely affecting the tax-exempt entities that were using such
corporations for nonabusive purposes.
D. Other Possible Solutions Would #ot Be as Effective
There are other ways that the government could address the abuses that
arise as a result of tax havens. For example, the IRS arguably does not need
the Stop Tax Havens Abuse Act or other anti-tax-haven legislation to go
after tax evasion using tax haven corporations. Some commentators have
suggested that the newly codified economic substance test should provide
the IRS with the tools to go after those who take advantage of offshore
blockers.240 Alternatively, Congress could impose taxes on all of a tax-

237

H.R. REP. NO. 109-455, at 128 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234, 323
(“The entity level tax does not apply if the entity’s participation is not willful and is due to reasonable
cause, except that the willful and reasonable cause exception does not apply to the tax imposed for
subsequently listed transactions.”).
238
Id. at 129 (“The conference agreement does not include the provision that the entity level or
entity manager tax does not apply if the entity’s participation is not willful and is due to reasonable
cause.”). Although Congress ultimately chose a strict liability penalty, it also increases the amount of the
penalty where the tax-exempt entity “knew, or had reason to know, a transaction was a prohibited tax
shelter transaction at the time the entity became a party to the transaction.” § 4965(b)(1)(B).
239
§ 4965(e)(1).
240
See James D. Reardon, Hedge Funds, ECI, and Economic Substance, 114 TAX NOTES 789, 789
(2007) (“But what really angers most commentators is that hedge funds, or offshore special purpose
entities, get involved in helping U.S. domestic taxpayers avoid U.S. income tax. . . . Those egregious
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exempt entity’s passive income. However, neither solution is likely to be as
effective as the reportable transaction rules are at preventing tax-exempt
entities from engaging in abusive transactions while freeing them from the
distortive effects of the unrelated debt-financed income rules. Both of the
solutions, moreover, would have a deleterious effect on tax-exempt entities,
just as treating foreign corporations managed in the United States as U.S.
corporations for tax purposes would.
1. Economic Substance.—Under the economic substance rules, the
IRS can disregard a transaction unless it both changes a taxpayer’s
economic position in a meaningful way, disregarding federal income tax
effects, and if the taxpayer has a substantial non-tax purpose for entering
into the transaction.241 How would economic substance address the tax
evasion? Presumably, it would allow the IRS to disregard the existence of
the blocker corporation and treat shareholders as if they directly owned the
blocker’s investments.242 However, “[t]he degree of corporate purpose and
activity requiring recognition of the corporation as a separate entity is
extremely low.”243 Hedge funds can argue that the offshore hedge fund has a
business purpose of raising capital from foreign investors and of avoiding
certain U.S. regulations that would apply if the fund were a U.S.
corporation.244
Moreover, even assuming that the economic substance rules were to
apply, it is unclear how they would solve the problem of tax evasion; they
would, however, harm tax-exempt entities. Specifically, if the IRS were to

situations really stand out. Many commentators have found the solution in the form of the codification
of the economic substance doctrine.”).
241
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat.
1029, 1067–68 (amending I.R.C. § 7701(o)).
242
Using economic substance considerations, the Tax Court has, in certain cases, disregarded
corporations and treated shareholders as if they directly earned the corporation’s income. See, e.g.,
Jondahl v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (RIA) 307, 316–17 (2005) (“However, even though a corporation is
organized under the laws of a State, we may disregard it for Federal tax purposes if it is no more than a
vehicle for tax avoidance and void of a legitimate business purpose.”); Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r,
33 T.C. 582, 604–05 (1959) (“The alphabet corporations were but the mechanical instruments which
amplified the tune, the melody and lyrics of which had been composed and written by Aldon, and it was
Aldon, through its controlling stockholders, which controlled the tempo and the finale—the distribution
of the profits. . . . Considering all the facts and circumstances herein, it is our opinion, and we so hold,
that the entire net income derived from the development of Tract 17169 is taxable to the petitioner,
Aldon Homes, Inc., under the provisions of section 22(a).”).
243
Strong v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976).
244
For example, a U.S. fund with more than 100 investors may be subject to regulation by the
S.E.C. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006). Even if tax-exempt entities had no non-tax reason for investing
through offshore blockers, however, it is not clear that the IRS would attack the blockers as lacking
economic substance. Even with the newly codified economic substance rules, “the ability of tax-exempt
organizations to avoid debt-financed income by investing through blockers is so universally accepted
that it is unlikely the IRS would begin to challenge it.” David S. Miller, How U.S. Tax Law Encourages
Investment Through Tax Havens, 131 TAX NOTES 167, 185 (2011).
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assert that the tax haven blocker should be disregarded, tax-exempt
investors would be treated as making leveraged investments either directly
or through a master partnership. Either way, a portion of the tax-exempt
investor’s investment would be treated as unrelated debt-financed income—
the result this Article is attempting to avoid.
On the other hand, those avoiding taxes are counting in large part on
the anonymity of tax haven investments to hide their money. Merely
disregarding the blocker corporation would not suddenly make these
invisible investors visible to the IRS. The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act does
not need to strip tax evaders of their anonymity in order to make their
evasive behavior less attractive. By treating the blocker corporation as a
U.S. corporation, the blocker will be taxable in the United States at ordinary
corporate rates, thus reducing the investment return currently enjoyed by
evaders and indirectly imposing tax on the evaders even without knowing
who they are. But disregarding the blocker corporation does not, in itself,
impose any tax (or other penalty) on evaders. In essence, using economic
substance would penalize tax-exempt entities, which are not behaving in an
abusive manner in any event, without touching tax-evaders. The result,
then, would be even worse than enacting the Stop Tax Havens Abuse Act
without enacting a fix to the unrelated debt-financed income rules.
2. Tax All Passive Income.—As another alternative, Congress could
eliminate the tax exemption on all passive income, rather than just passive
income earned from a leveraged investment. At one level, taxing all of a
tax-exempt entity’s passive income would have a similar effect on the
entity’s investment decisions as exempting all of its passive income from
tax: because it would be taxable whether its investment were leveraged or
not, a tax-exempt entity would no longer be discouraged from investing in a
leveraged partnership.245
Moreover, because taxing all of a tax-exempt entity’s taxable income
would reduce the after-tax return of their investments, it would likely cause
tax-exempt entities to rely more on public contributions and less on
investment returns.246 Finally, taxing tax-exempt entities on all of their
investment income could discourage them from investing in tax haven
blockers even more than would exempting all investment income from
tax.247 Not only would tax-exempt entities face the possibility of two levels
of taxation on a portion of their income, but they could realistically become
subject to the subpart F and PFIC antiabuse rules that currently apply to
investments by taxable persons.
Still, taxing tax-exempt entities on all of their investment income is
probably an undesirable solution. It flies in the face of Congress’s express
245
246
247
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policy decision as it created the UBTI: tax-exempt entities’ passive income
should not be taxable.248 Although Congress may certainly revisit that
decision, treating all of a tax-exempt entity’s passive income as taxable
would radically redefine the meaning of the tax exemption. “[T]axing all
investment income earned by at least certain tax-exempt entities could
significantly interfere with the purpose of granting their exemption in the
first place.”249 Before interfering so fundamentally with the tax exemption’s
purpose, it would be necessary to determine that the social gains
outweighed the harms, both to tax-exempt entities and to those who benefit
from tax-exempt entities.
CONCLUSION
The unrelated debt-financed income rules have a significant distortive
effect on the investments of tax-exempt entities. As a result of these rules,
tax-exempts that want to invest in leveraged investment funds generally
have to invest through a blocker corporation organized in a tax haven
jurisdiction, or they have to pay taxes on their investment income.
However, Congress clearly never intended for tax-exempt entities to pay
taxes on their investment income. Moreover, the IRS has blessed
investment by a tax-exempt entity through offshore blocker corporations as
being nonabusive.
Nonetheless, tax havens provide a number of opportunities for taxable
U.S. persons to illegitimately and, in many cases, illegally evade taxes. The
U.S. government has a legitimate interest in aggressively working to
counteract these potential abuses. As long as the unrelated debt-financed
income rules remain law, however, any tax legislation that makes tax
havens less hospitable to taxable U.S. persons will also harm tax-exempt
entities.
This Article has demonstrated that the unrelated debt-financed income
rules do not serve any central function in the regulation of tax-exempt
entities. Instead, they were intended to prevent taxable persons from using
an entity’s tax exemption in order to reduce the taxable person’s tax
liability. But because the unrelated debt-financed income rules solely
penalize the tax-exempt entity (that is, the party that benefits less from these
transactions), they have been less than completely effective.
If, instead, Congress were to repeal the unrelated debt-financed income
rules and expand the reportable transaction rules, it could aggressively
address the problems of the abusive use of tax havens without sacrificing
the benefits it determined beneficial to grant to tax-exempt entities. By
moving to the reportable transactions regime, the IRS would discourage
both taxable persons and tax-exempt entities from abusively shifting the
248
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See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Cauble, supra note 53, at 747.
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benefits of the tax exemption. Moreover, without tax-exempt entities having
a legitimate, nonabusive reason to invest through tax haven blockers,
Congress will be free to move as strongly as it deems necessary to create
norms and laws that discourage the abuse of tax havens by U.S. taxpayers.
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